KOREAN REUNIFICATION FAILURE FROM THE TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

This article explains the relationship between the policy of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which is a constitutional obligation of North Korea and South Korea, with the interests of a number of external actors who also have interests in the region, especially the United States, Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. From the perspective of two-level game theory developed by Putnam (1988), the domestic political dynamics that occur in North Korea and South Korea of course play a very important role. Since its founding, North Korea has experienced almost no regime changes, so it is relatively easy to understand North Korea’s foreign policy regarding reunification. Meanwhile, regime change in South Korea created unique conflict dynamics that opened and closed opportunities for reunification. In the South Korean government led by conservative groups, the chances of reunification are reduced or even completely closed. Meanwhile, during the government of the progressive group, the chances of reunification and peace on the Korean Peninsula were quite promising, as seen in the 2018-2019 period when South Korea was led by the progressive figure Moon Jaein. However, internal dynamics in the two Koreas are not the sole determining factor. The growing political interests and dynamics in countries with direct interests in the Korean Peninsula also make a significant contribution.