

KOREAN REUNIFICATION FAILURE FROM THE TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This article explains the relationship between the policy of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which is a constitutional obligation of North Korea and South Korea, with the interests of a number of external actors who also have interests in the region, especially the United States, Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. From the perspective of two-level game theory developed by Putnam (1988), the domestic political dynamics that occur in North Korea and South Korea of course play a very important role. Since its founding, North Korea has experienced almost no regime changes, so it is relatively easy to understand North Korea's foreign policy regarding reunification. Meanwhile, regime change in South Korea created unique conflict dynamics that opened and closed opportunities for reunification. In the South Korean government led by conservative groups, the chances of reunification are reduced or even completely closed. Meanwhile, during the government of the progressive group, the chances of reunification and peace on the Korean Peninsula were quite promising, as seen in the 2018-2019 period when South Korea was led by the progressive figure Moon Jaein. However, internal dynamics in the two Koreas are not the sole determining factor. The growing political interests and dynamics in countries with direct interests in the Korean Peninsula also make a significant contribution.

Keywords: Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, Reunification, Foreign Policy, Two Level Game Theory

INTRODUCTION

The opportunity for reunification of the Korean Peninsula was open again in the 2018-2019 period. Moon Jaein, the leader of South Korea from the progressive camp who views North Korea as a dialogue partner to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula, has maintained intense communication with Kim Jong Un. The two leaders met at the Third Inter-Korean Summit at the Joint Security Area (JSA), in Panmunjom, on April 27, 2018. In September 2018 the Fourth Inter-Korean Summit was held in Pyongyang, North Korea.

Apart from establishing communication that was able to reduce tensions between the two Koreas, Moon Jaein also bridged talks between North Korea and the United States as one of the external actors which for a long time influenced the dynamics of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. President Donald Trump and President Kim Jong Un's first talks were held in Singapore in June 2018. In the meeting with Trump, Kim agreed to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. In fact, before the meeting in Singapore, North Korea had already demonstrated its commitment to

denuclearization by destroying the Punggye-ri nuclear facility in North Hamgyong Province. At this nuclear facility in September 2017 North Korea tested a hydrogen bomb underground which produced earthquakes as far away as China and Japan.

Eight months later, in February 2019 Trump and Kim met again. This time in Hanoi, Vietnam. Unlike in Singapore, the meeting in Hanoi ended without any written agreement after on the second day of the meeting Kim Jong Un refused to sign the draft communiqué that had been prepared on the table. After the failure of that meeting, in June 2019 Moon Jaein facilitated a meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at Panmunjom which was only a consultation and did not produce written policies.

The chances of peace and Korean reunification faded again after pragmatic Republican Donald Trump was defeated by Democrat Joe Biden in the presidential election that year. Meanwhile, in 2022 Moon Jaein was also replaced by Yoon Sukyeol, a former Attorney General who was supported by conservative groups. After regime changes in South Korea and the United States, tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the East Asian region have increased significantly. President Yoon's administration views North Korea as a source of threat and at the same time is increasing defense cooperation and various military exercises with the United States. Changes in the foreign policies of South Korea and the United States as a consequence of regime changes in both countries has forced North Korea to take more or less similar steps.

In January 2024, in the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly of Korea, in his capacity as President of the State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong Un requested the Korean Peninsula be removed from the North Korean Constitution. In other words, if previously North Korea viewed South Korea as a Korean region that had not been liberated from colonialism, now North Korea views South Korea as a different political entity, both in terms of geography and socio-political system.

North Korea's decision can be viewed from two sides. First it raises concerns about increasing tensions which will endanger the region and the global arena because at the same time it will be followed by an arms race in the region, including the possible use of nuclear weapons. Second, Kim Jong Un's decision can also be seen as a proposal for a "two-state solution" that places North Korea and South Korea as two countries living side by side. The challenge to this second view is the international community's efforts to construct peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.

This article will specifically discuss the factors that caused the failure of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, seen from the dynamics that occurred in North Korea and South Korea, as well as recent developments that occurred in the international arena involving countries that have geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The reunification of the Korean Peninsula is one of the classical issues in international relations studies. McComack (1982), Kwak (1992), and Barna (1998) assess the reunification of the Korean Peninsula as a political goal that is difficult to realize, although not impossible. Wolf Jr. (2002) analyzed the management costs of Korean reunification. Eberstadt (1999) and Koh (1971) discuss the dilemma and various efforts that can be made to accelerate Korean reunification. Research using quantitative analysis of Korean reunification within a cost-benefit analysis framework was carried out by Chiou (1986). In a more recent study, Scalapino (2006) concluded that Korean culture and nationalism are a combination of the Korean Peninsula's unique and strategic geographical position among other large nations such as the United States, the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Russian Federation, also plays a role.

Lee's (1994) study of Korean reunification not long after the end of the Cold War viewed it as a necessary prerequisite for the Korean nation to play a more appropriate role in the future. The Korean nation, numbering more than 60 million people, with traditions and culture formed over thousands of years, is considered unable to place itself properly in the modern world. The cause of this incompetence was the tragic national division, which occurred due to pressure from foreign powers, especially at the end of the Second World War. The role of foreign powers in the formation of North Korea and South Korea has been widely discussed and researched by academics. For example, by Breen (2004), Cumings (2005 and 2011), Haruki (2014), and Seth (2019).

To complete this article, the author also refers to a number of literatures from North Korea which provides important insights regarding the reunification discourse. For example, Ri's (1999) work discusses war and humanitarian crimes committed by Japan during its occupation of the Korean Peninsula. Also, Ryo's work (1995) discusses the 38th Parallel which is the dividing line between the two Koreas. Another study from North Korea that explains the struggle of foreign interests that had a significant influence on the division of the two Koreas is a book written by Kim (2001) which discusses possible war and peace scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.

Basically, this article examines North Korea and South Korea's policies regarding relations with each other. Foreign policy is interpreted as a set of strategies and actions of a country to influence the international environment to make it easier for that country to fight for its interests and achieve its goals. Foreign policy can also be understood as the implementation of foreign policy not only to maintain the existence of a country but also to maximize the role of a country in interacting with other countries in the international environment (Affianty, 2015). In other words, foreign policy is a strategic step by a country to achieve national goals amidst interactions with other countries (Lovell, 1970). Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions that to some extent involve relations between one country and other countries (Bojang, 2018).

Holsti (1992) underlines that foreign policy is based on the values, ideas and thinking of an elite group of policy makers who have authority in the domestic environment. El-Dessouki (2018) recognizes the role of values, ideas and thoughts of a small group of ruling elites in a country in formulating foreign policy. He said that foreign policy was basically influenced by the orientation of elite groups. Therefore, domestic political structure is an important part of the explanation of a country's foreign policy. This means understanding domestic political factors is a must to understand overall foreign policy.

Decision making on the other hand is a process that directs (steering process) and makes adjustments in response to feedback from the international environment to influence or completely change the international environment. Furthermore, feedback from the international environment is monitored and the impact of the attitudes shown and actions taken is evaluated. Evaluations and other information obtained from the international environment will be included in the subsequent decision-making process (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014).

Putnam (1988) notes that negotiations that take place in the global arena are actually the culmination of a two-level game, namely the national environment and the international arena. In the national environment, domestic groups fight for their interests and pressure the government to adopt policies that benefit them, on the other hand politicians seek power by building coalitions with these groups. Meanwhile, in the international arena, national governments which have the authority and legitimacy to formulate a country's foreign policy seek to maximize their ability to deal with domestic pressures, while at the same time minimizing the negative impacts of international environmental pressures. These two things will not be ignored by decision makers at the national level as long as the state's interests are maintained and the state remains sovereign.

In interactions in the international environment, it can be said that each national political leader at the same time faces two different game boards. On the side of the "international table" sit their foreign colleagues, namely foreign policy makers in other countries. Meanwhile, on the "domestic table" side sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for various domestic institutions, representatives of various interest groups, and their own political advisors.

According to Putnam, the unusual complexity of this two-level game is that actions that are rational for players on one side of the table may very well be seen as disadvantageous for players on the other side of the table. Nonetheless, there is a strong incentive to maintain consistent play at both tables. In the end, national leaders and foreign policy makers as well as kibitzers (observers) will provide a certain tolerance for things agreed at the international table.

Putnam further emphasized that the political complexity faced by players in this two-level game model is extraordinary. Any key player at the international table who is deemed not optimal will disappoint his teammates. Conversely, national leaders who fail to satisfy their colleagues at the domestic table may be removed from their seats.

It can be said that the two variables, the national environment and the international arena, have an equally important role, so it is futile to debate which of the two variables has the most influence. In a number of cases studied by Putnam, the influence of each variable was often given a value such as 70 percent of the influence of international pressure and 30 percent of domestic politics, or 50-50 for each variable, and so on. These numbers are used to provide an overview of the influence of external variables and internal variables in a discourse that leads to the choice of policy strategy. These figures are not definitive, but are merely an illustration to facilitate efforts to compare international entanglements and domestic entanglements.

The unification of two countries is the object of integration theory developed by a number of political theorists, for example Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) who argue that integration of two countries can occur at various social, economic and political levels. Meanwhile, Etzioni (1965) considered that social and economic integration between the two countries was easier to achieve than political integration because political integration requires identification that involves the community as a whole. This seems to apply in the case of the Korean Peninsula considering that the Korean political systems of South Korea and North Korea have developed in such a way and seem clearly different from each other, not to say contradictory. Haas (1958) defined integration as a process in which political actors in several different national settings are persuaded to shift their allegiances, hopes, and political activities to a new center, whose institutions have or claim jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. Lindberg (1963) defined integration as a process in which states forge the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make decisions together, or to delegate the decision-making process to a new central organ.

Etzioni (1965) further said that a stable paradigm needs to be formed to achieve political integration. He defines the final product of the unification process as a “political community” which can be divided into at least three types of integration. First, integration which has an effective center on the use of violent tools. Second, integration where decision-making centers are able to significantly influence the allocation of resources and rewards throughout society. Finally, integration where the previous two things become the dominant focus of political identification for the majority of politically aware citizens. Total integration and unification can thus only occur when a political community has been formed.

Regarding political communities, Sunoo (1979) argues that political integration involves a shift in the political center by both parties. This is difficult to achieve because it “touches on the issue of citizen loyalty”. One school of thought holds that the best way to achieve political integration is to initiate a process that focuses on limited functional areas such as the economy and welfare. Success in these tasks can facilitate the gradual transfer of loyalties to broader political units. Although this applies to complete unification, it is not agreed that the unification process must occur all at once (Kwak, 1983).

RESEARCH METHODE

To understand the issue of reunification on the Korean Peninsula, which is very dynamic, complex, and cannot be separated from various interpretations that continue to develop so that precision and in-depth understanding are needed, in this research the researcher used descriptive qualitative research methods. According to Patton (1990), this research method seeks to understand the actions of parties or actors through observations that are strengthened by document analysis. Qualitative research places emphasis on the process side of the problem being studied so that it can capture substantial meaning (Cresswell, 1998). This method can also be used to gather in-depth insight from the problems being studied, and can produce new ideas for further research if deemed necessary.

The important moments that are the focus of this research are the various peace talks held between the two Koreas and other interested parties in the region, including talks between United States President Donald Trump and North Korean President Kim Jong in Singapore in June 2018 and in Hanoi in February 2019. The author assesses that these various peace talks have played a role that cannot be seen as small in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula as a whole.

Thus, as stated by Cresswell (2003), this research will dissect and provide interpretations of the actions of the actors involved in the issue of reunification of the Korean Peninsula through observations, views of sources, analysis of various news reports, as well as the attitudes and/or decisions of related institutions.

In line with Cresswell's explanation regarding qualitative research, the author recorded and analyzed symptoms or events that occurred as a result of interactions between the two Koreas and interactions between the two Koreas with other state actors who had an interest and were involved in peace talks on the Korean Peninsula.

In qualitative research, a researcher has an important role as the main instrument in data collection and analysis. A researcher is also expected to be directly involved in the field, physically connecting with individuals involved in the main research theme, location or institution, making observations and recording the behavior and natural background of the main theme being researched. Thus, in this research the researcher positions himself as the main instrument for collecting and analyzing data, including data obtained from the researcher's interactions with representatives of the two main state actors in this research.

Secondary data in this research comes from various reports that accompanied the peace talks between the two Koreas recently, especially in the period 2018 to 2019, and the final result was the failure of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

The author also studied the results of studies from various academic works that provide an understanding of the foreign policies of the two Koreas and the involvement of key countries in the theme of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, namely the United States, Japan, the People's

Republic of China, and the Russian Federation. Among the academic works there are those by North Korean academics.

The main units of analysis in this research are two state actors, namely the Republic of Korea or South Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea. Researchers will also analyze the policies of the United States, Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, which are influential in determining the foreign policies of the two Koreas. The four countries were involved in Six Party Talks to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue after in January 2003 North Korea decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The first talks were held in China in August 2003. North Korea left the Six Party Talks in April 2009.

On the other hand, this research also explains relations between countries that have equal levels in an anarchic world political framework, but have asymmetrical differences in influence in an alliance framework. Therefore, this research will describe the role of the constitution in determining the foreign policies of South Korea and North Korea, as well as the relations between South Korea and North Korea with the United States, the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Russian Federation.

Researchers used the snowball technique in determining sources. Data collection began by interviewing key sources from the North Korean Ambassador to Indonesia, Amb. An Kwang Il, and two South Korean Ambassadors to Indonesia, Amb. Kim Chang-beom and Amb. Park Tae-sung. To complete the research, the author also interviewed the former Indonesian Ambassador to South Korea, Amb. Umar Hadi, as well as international relations observer and lecturer at Padjadjaran University who has visited North Korea, Dr. Teuku Rezasyah.

As the main instrument in this research, the author utilized personal experiences from relations and interactions with the two Koreas. The author has visited North Korea several times and met with a number of North Korean officials within the framework of a visit to the Indonesia-North Korea Friendship Institute of which the author is currently the chairman. The Author's first visit to North Korea was in April 2003, shortly after North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT, and the last visit was in October 2018 after a meeting between South Korean President Moon Jaein and President Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. The author also visited Singapore to attend the meeting of US President Donald Trump and North Korean President Kim Jong Un in June 2018 and their meeting in Singapore in February 2019.

Understanding that qualitative research is a series of activities or a process of filtering information about a problem in certain conditions, aspects or fields. Researchers carry out research using a qualitative approach where the materials collected are in the form of opinions, responses, information, concepts and information in the form of descriptions. problem.

Data collection was carried out through in-depth interviews with sources who were considered competent, as mentioned in the previous section, and study of various documents resulting from talks between North Korea and South Korea to improve relations between the two countries. Researchers also studied defense cooperation agreement documents between North Korea and its two alliance countries, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, as well as documents on South Korea's defense cooperation or alliance with Japan and the United States. Likewise with the joint communique of President Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump produced at a meeting in Singapore in June 2018.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

The Korean peninsula was divided into two countries due to the struggle for influence after the Second World War between the United States and its allies in the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union and its allies in the Eastern Bloc. The Korean nation, which before Japanese colonialism was a homogeneous entity, was divided into two different ideological poles. South Korea has a liberal bent, while North Korea has a socialist/communist bent. Even though they were divided, the two Koreas harbored a desire to reunite. In North Korea, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a theme that is considered sacred and fought for, which is why it is taught to the younger generation through education in schools from an early age. In South Korea, several surveys in 2020 and 2021 show that the theme of the unification of the Korean Peninsula is still considered important by the younger generation.

Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a constitutional duty for both North and South Korea. This means that in the constitutions of the two Koreas, reunification is stated explicitly. In the South Korean Constitution which was adopted in 1948, in Article 3 Chapter I General Definitions it is stated that "the territory of the Republic of Korea consists of the Korean Peninsula and the islands adjacent to it" and in the next article it is emphasized that the Republic of Korea "sought to unify and formulate and implement a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy."

In carrying out its constitutional duties regarding reunification, South Korea uses a gradual and peaceful strategy by excluding the use of force to achieve unification. Meanwhile, in the Socialist Constitution of North Korea which was adopted in 2017, Article 1 Chapter I Politics states that North Korea is an "independent socialist state that represents the interests of the entire Korean nation". In the next article, it is stated that, as a revolutionary country, North Korea inherited superior traditions formed during the struggle against imperialism to achieve homeland independence and people's prosperity. For North Korea, reunification is not only related to the unification of the two Koreas but is also part of the struggle to free itself from those who colonized and interfered in inter-Korean relations. Furthermore, in Article 9, the Socialist Constitution emphasizes that North Korea must strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern part of Korea by strengthening the power of the people and vigorously carrying out three

revolutions, namely ideology, technology and culture. The reunification of the Korean Peninsula is said to be based on the principles of independence, peace and national unity.

Road Map to Korean Reunification

The issue of unification in this situation became the basis for the legitimacy of both governments. While the two countries have different plans for how this integration should occur, they both agree that the ultimate solution is total and complete social, economic, political, and geographic integration. Total integration in these four areas then becomes the unification definition on which the model is based.

Looking at the two Korea's statements and proposals, there are three assumptions that must be made. First, North Korea and South Korea actually say what they mean. This implies government support for the announced reunification policy. Second, North Korea and South Korea are jointly striving towards the complete unification of their countries. Third, that there is actually a common interest in unification which is recognized by both parties.

The second possibility was conveyed by the South Korean Ambassador to Indonesia, Kim Chaengbeom, to researchers in an interview in early November 2018. He explained that for quite a long time, the final solution from the talks that had been carried out by South Korea and North Korea was the formation of one Korean. He assumed that the journey towards reunification of the Korean Peninsula was like a marathon that required perseverance, perseverance and serious efforts, and also required a comprehensive approach from the two Koreas to address various important issues.

"In the Panmunjom Declaration the goal was set that we should reduce military tensions and reduce any risk of confrontation, and also begin discussions on how to establish lasting and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. "However, the first thing is to try to end the hostile status and ceasefire," he said. The Panmunjom Declaration is a political commitment signed by South Korean President Moon Jaein and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un at the Third Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018.

As a starting point, this research uses the reunification proposal as presented by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1981, and the proposal submitted separately by South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan in January 1982. There are very significant differences between the two reunification proposals. From the perspective of Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) this "positional bargaining" proposal fails to produce wise, efficient, and amicable agreements.

The reunification proposal offered by Kim Il Sung began with the formation of the Supreme National Confederal Assembly (SNCA), which was filled in equal numbers by representatives from North Korea, South Korea and Korean descendants living outside the Korean

Peninsula. After that there is an institution called the Confederal Standing Committee (CSC) which functions to guide regional government and manage all confederal affairs (Kwak, 1983).

North Korea also stated that the proposal of the Federated Democratic Republic of Korea that they offered was neutral and had no affiliation and did not build an alliance with any political or military bloc. Apart from being an umbrella for two autonomous governments in North Korea and South Korea, the CSC also formed a defense and security body consisting of a combination of North Korean troops and South Korean troops. The structure offered by North Korea has the characteristics and characteristics of North Korea, where political power is centralized in an institution called the “supreme assembly” and the bodies below it must follow the “confederation agenda” decided by the “supreme assembly”.

North Korea also set several preconditions that South Korea had to agree to before forming the RDFK, namely eliminating fascist rule in South Korea, abolishing confrontational anti-communist policies, repealing the National Security Law, removing US troops from South Korea, and releasing political prisoners including Korean political activists. South affiliated with communist groups or parties.

Meanwhile, the proposal submitted by President Chun Doohwan on January 22 1982 encouraged the two Koreas to engage in cooperation at a lower level involving non-governmental actors until it would ultimately lead to the unification of the two governments. After receiving and processing various views, considerations, suggestions and so on submitted by think tank institutions and the public, the next phase is to form a Consultative Council for National Reunification. This council consists of an equal number of representatives from North Korea and South Korea. Next, the Consultative Council drafted a constitution that would be used to build a democratic and united Korea. After this phase is completed, it will continue with a referendum held throughout the Korean Peninsula to obtain popular approval for the United Korean Constitution (Kwak, 1983).

If the United Korean Constitution can be accepted, then the next phase will be the establishment of institutions carrying out power, both legislative and executive, through free and open general elections. South Korea proposed several interim measures to be included in an agreement on relations between the two Koreas during a “transition period.” The proposed steps include, first, an affirmation that relations between North and South Korea must be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity pending unification. Second, North Korea and South Korea must abandon all forms of use of violence and military force, as well as threats to use such force, and prioritize peaceful solutions through negotiations.

Third, in the reunification process, North Korea and South Korea must recognize the existing political order and institutions and must not interfere in the other’s internal affairs. Fourth, the two Koreas must maintain the ceasefire regime in force to end the arms race and military confrontation. Fifth, North Korea and South Korea must also provide opportunities for people in

the North and South to travel, interact with each other in order to promote exchange and cooperation. Sixth, both parties must respect other applicable bilateral and multilateral agreements. Finally, North Korea and South Korea must appoint plenipotentiary envoys with cabinet minister-level rank to lead representative missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

Despite the differences between the two proposals, which are motivated by the ideologies and political practices that apply in each country, it should be noted that there are several common interests that can be identified. The problem between the two Koreas is not in the fact that their respective primary interests are different, but rather lies in the vehicles or instruments needed to achieve those interests. Because several common interests can be identified, in an effort to answer the issue of reunification it is important to, first, highlight these interests, and second, understand the various factors that influence the process of achieving these interests.

It should also be noted that both proposals more or less reflect previous agreements reached in talks between South Korean envoys and North Korean envoys in 1972. On May 2 to 5 of that year, the Director of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hurak, visited Pyongyang. While in the North Korean capital, Lee Hurak met the Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers' Party, Kim Young Joo, who is also the younger brother of North Korean supreme leader Kim Il Sung. The North Korean side's return visit to the South Korean capital, Seoul, was carried out from May 29 to June 1 1972. North Korean Deputy Prime Minister Park Sung Chul representing Kim Young Joo met and further discussed the peace scheme and unification of the two Koreas with Director Lee Hurak. The meeting in Pyongyang and Seoul resulted in "The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué" which underscored the desire of the two Koreas to achieve the peaceful unification of their nations as early as possible. In this document, North Korea and South Korea agreed on the principle of independence in the reunification process, which means that reunification is carried out without interference from foreign parties by using peaceful methods without violence against and overcoming differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.

After the "South-North Joint Communiqué" signed on July 4 1972, followed by the reunification proposal from North Korea in 1981 and the South Korean unification proposal in 1982, the two Koreas continued communication in various fields, from economics to sports. On September 18, 1984, Chun Doohwan's government received a request for assistance from North Korea which was being hit by floods. Then in May 1987 at the "South-North Red Cross Conference" an agreement was reached to reunite families separated by the war. This activity was carried out in September of that year. It could be said that in the 1980s, relations between the two Koreas experienced ups and downs. A number of incidents that claimed the lives of both sides occurred on the border throughout that decade.

In the early 1990s, as signs of failure of the Eastern Bloc began to appear and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea were accepted

as members of the UN. On August 8, 1991 the UN Security Council issued Resolution 702 recommending that the two Koreas become members of the UN. This recommendation was welcomed by the UN General Assembly which on September 17 1991 formalized the membership of North Korea and South Korea. Membership in the UN has become a new platform for peace talks between the two Koreas. On December 13, 1991, the document “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North” was signed by South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-shik and his North Korean colleague Yon Hyong Muk. In this document it is stated that the “Reconciliation Agreement” of December 1991 was in line with the longing of all Korean people for the peaceful unification of their homeland. Both parties reaffirmed the three principles of unification contained in the July 1972 “Joint South-North Communiqué.”

To achieve national reconciliation the two Koreas are determined to eliminate political and military confrontation, as well as avoid aggression and armed hostility, reducing tensions. The two Koreas will also realize multi-aspect exchanges and cooperation to advance shared national interests and prosperity, apart from recognizing that the relationship between the two Koreas is not a relationship between two different countries, but rather a temporary and special relationship in the process towards reunification. Several articles in the December 1991 “Reconciliation Agreement” stated, among other things, that the two Koreas must recognize and respect each other’s systems. Then, both parties must not interfere in each other’s internal affairs and must not slander or speak ill of each other. Both parties must not carry out acts of sabotage or subversion against each other, and both parties must work together to change the current ceasefire situation into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and must comply with the signed ceasefire agreement. on July 27, 1953 until this state of peace was achieved and realized.

After that, on January 20 1992, to ensure the security of the Korean Peninsula from nuclear danger, Chung Won-shik and Yon Hyong Muk representing their respective countries signed the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” or “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Peninsula Korea”. In this declaration, North Korea and South Korea realized that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a necessary situation to create peace and achieve Korean national unity and contribute to maintaining peace and security in Asia and the world. In the document “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in January 1992, North Korea and South Korea agreed not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, distribute or use nuclear weapons. The two Koreas agreed to use nuclear energy only for purposes. The two Koreas also promised not to have nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, apart from jointly inspecting each country’s nuclear facilities by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

The First Inter-Korean Summit attended by South Korean President Kim Daejung and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il took place from 13 to 15 June 2000 in Pyongyang. One of the main factors why this meeting could occur was the regime change in South Korea, from

conservative groups who saw North Korea solely as a threat to progressive groups who saw North Korea as a dialogue partner towards lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. During this meeting, Kim Daejung and Kim Jong Il drew up a road map towards peace on the Korean Peninsula and the reunification of the two Koreas. Both acknowledged that the summit meeting and talks were very important in promoting mutual understanding towards each other in developing South-North relations and realizing peaceful reunification. The points of agreement in the “South-North Joint Declaration” as a result of this historic meeting once again underscore the issue of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people. South Korea proposed the concept of confederation and North Korea offered a loose form of federation. Both countries agreed that the reunification they wanted to achieve was moving in that direction. In order to achieve reunification, the two Koreas agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced national economic development through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in the civil, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields.

High-level talks involving the leaders of the two Koreas were held again on October 4, 2007 in Pyongyang between Chairman Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moohyun. Like his predecessor, Roh Moohyun is also a progressive group figure and continues the Sunshine Policy initiated by Kim Daejung which has been proven to reduce tensions between the two Koreas. The “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity” is in line with previous talks between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il in June 2000.

From the reunification proposal submitted by North Korea in 1981 and that submitted by South Korea in 1982 as well as from various documents produced at meeting after meeting attended by key figures from both Koreas, it is clear that Pyongyang and Seoul have the same interests and desires regarding peace and reunification of the Peninsula. Korea. However, the external environment has exerted such influence and even pressure that the two Koreas find it difficult to move further in realizing this grand agenda.

Regime Change and Security Dilemma in Korean Peninsula

North Korea and South Korea realize that after the Japanese Empire’s occupation and colonization of the Korean Peninsula which lasted for quite a long time, from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, the two Koreas grew into two different political societies. Both have unique viewpoints and ideologies as well as political systems and practices.

Since North Korea was founded so far, there has been almost no regime change in North Korea. Even though it contains the words “republic”, “people”, and “democratic” in North Korea’s official name, observers believe that there is a strong impression that political (and also economic) affairs are controlled by the family of Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong Il, and his grandson Kim Jong Un, and their circle. Thus, the transfer of power from Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jong Il,


then from his son Kim Jong Il to his grandson Kim Jong Un, did not bring a political policy color that was too different, let alone contradictory.

When he came to power after Kim Il Sung's death in July 1994, Kim Jong Il introduced the Songun policy which placed defense matters as the first and foremost priority. However, Songun was not a completely new policy, but had been introduced by Kim Il Sung when he together with his contemporaries, who were usually called "big men from Mount Paektu", fought against the Japanese occupation. Armed resistance was the method chosen by Kim Il Sung's group to expel Japan from the Korean Peninsula. Apart from that, Juche became a kind of practical side of Juche ideology.

Likewise, the Byungjin approach was introduced by Kim Jong Un after he came to power replacing his father who died in December 2011. Byungjin's approach encourages North Korea to be more active in carrying out development in two sectors at once, the economic sector and the defense or military sector. In the economic sector, Kim Jong Un introduced the policy of "Inmin Daejung" or "People First" and the regional development credo "20x10" which means building 20 cities in North Korea within ten years. It is in this economic and development context that the defense sector has increasingly important meaning. The defense sector is a kind of guarantor for smooth development. It is this view that drives North Korea to continue developing its arsenal, especially after the failure of the 2019 Hanoi talks and regime changes in the United States in 2020 and in South Korea in 2022.


North Korea's latest weapons capacity can be seen in the report prepared by the Missile Defense Advocacies Alliance (MDAA) in November 2022 as follow:

North Korea's Short-Medium Range Missiles



Source: MDAA, 2022

North Korea's Intercontinental Missile



Source: MDAA, 2022

As for South Korea, since the beginning of independence the national political journey has been very dynamic. The first president, Rhee Syngman, was a figure in conservative civil society groups who built authoritarianism. As a fighter for Korean independence since the late 19th century, Rhee dreamed of a Korea, and the ideal Korea he dreamed of was a Korea that adopted the values of freedom that he found in the United States, where he fled during the Japanese colonial era. Therefore, one of the characteristics of civil authoritarianism in the Rhee era was that it did not provide space for communist groups, both North Korean communists and communists or at least communist sympathizers in South Korea. Throughout the Korean War, apart from sending troops to the battlefield, Rhee also eliminated communist groups in South Korea which he said were accomplices of foreign interests, in this case the Soviet Union and China. Rhee even refused to sign the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War. This shows his unwillingness to make peace with the communists and divide the two Koreas.

After the era of Rhee Syngman's conservative civilian authoritarianism, South Korea entered the era of conservative military authoritarianism, starting with the Park Chunghee government which lasted from 1962 to 1979. After a transitional government led by civilian politician Park Choonghoon, which was ineffective for a short time, the government returned controlled by military figures who had close ties to Park Chunghee, namely Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988) and Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). After Roh Tae-woo, the South Korean government was continued by a civilian figure, Kim Youngsam (1993-1998), who was also part of the conservative group. In general, conservative groups view North Korea as a source of national security threat that cannot be underestimated. To ward off possible attacks from North Korea, the South Korean government led by conservative groups feels the need to increase military capacity and capabilities

and at the same time strengthen the alliance with the United States, which in fact has never left the Korean Peninsula since the Second World War and the Korean War ended. However, there is absolutely no room for dialogue. In the Roh Taewoo era, dialogue through the UN platform was used, especially after the Soviet Union, which was North Korea's political and economic patron, seemed to be struggling to deal with internal dynamics and finally disbanded.

Significant political changes in South Korea only occurred in 1998, after progressive civil figure Kim Daejung won the presidential election. The victory of this progressive group also had a very significant impact on relations between the two Koreas and talks towards peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Progressive groups of course have not forgotten the bad and bitter experiences experienced by South Korea due to North Korea's aggressiveness. However, for progressive groups in South Korea, North Korea is a dialogue partner to end hostilities, create peace, and if possible, reunite the two separated Koreas. That is why Kim Daejung did not hesitate to open up and strengthen communication with North Korea. The result of this attitude was the First Inter-Korean Summit which took place in June 2000. The Sunshine Policy he introduced was able to change North Korea's attitude.

Kim Daejung's offer to build a joint industrial area in Kaesong, for example, was accepted by Kim Jong Il, and North Korea benefited quite a bit from this collaboration. This Sunshine policy was continued by Roh Moohyun who replaced Kim Daejung from 2003 to 2008. After the Sunshine era, South Korea was again led by conservative civil figures, Lee Myungbak (2008-2013) and Park Geunhye (2013-2017). Both President Lee and President Park adopted a tougher policy towards North Korea and at the same time strengthened military cooperation relations with the United States. This change in South Korean politics also prompted a change in North Korea's attitude. Moreover, at almost the same time, Kim Jong Il was rarely seen in public. For example, he was not present at the military parade held to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of North Korea on September 9 2008. Kim Jong Il's declining health condition was conveyed by Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso when speaking in the Japanese Parliament at the end of November 2008. According to a *New York Time* report, Prime Minister Aso said he doubted that Kim Jong Il would recover and make decisions as before.

News of Kim Jong Il's declining health was followed by speculation about who his successor would be, and what general policies North Korea's new leader would take on domestic issues as well as regional and global issues. For South Korea and the United States, because North Korea's political system is closed and difficult to penetrate, the various speculations that are developing regarding Kim Jong Il's health condition and the person who has the greatest chance of succeeding him are certainly very confusing. So as a step to overcome all speculation regarding Kim Jong Il's health condition and the change of leadership in North Korea, South Korea chose to further intensify military exercises with the United States in the border area. This typical policy of the conservative group lasted until Kim Jong Il died in December 2011 and was replaced by his youngest son, Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un's presence, which was barely anticipated by the

international community, prompted South Korea and the United States to continue to be careful, which means ensuring troop readiness.

In August 2017, according to a Guardian report, the United States had three military bases in South Korea consisting of a Navy base in Chinhae and two Air Force bases in Osan and Kunsan. Meanwhile in Japan, which is across the Korean Peninsula, the United States has three Air Force bases, namely Misawa, Yokota, and Kadena, as well as four Navy bases, namely Yokosuka, Atsugi, Sasebo, and Fleet Command near Kadena. Meanwhile in November 2018, the South China Morning Post reported about dozens of United States military camps in South Korea.

On August 29, 2017 North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 medium-range intercontinental missile. Traveling 2,700 km and reaching its highest point of 550 meters, the Hwasong-12 crossed Hokkaido, Japan, before finally landing at a point in the Pacific Ocean, around 1,180 km from Japanese territory. North Korea admitted that the launch of the Hwasong-12 was their response to joint military exercises by the United States and the Republic of Korea or South Korea in the border area. The Ulji Freedom Guardian military exercise is seen by North Korea as a provocation and expression of the United States' relentless hostile policy towards North Korea.

In an interview with the author at the end of August 2017, two days after the launch of the Hwasong-12, North Korean Ambassador An Kwang Il explained the reasons behind the launch of the Hwasong-12. According to him, Donald J. Trump, who won the United States presidential election in November 2016 and was inaugurated as President of the United States in January 2017, maintained a hostile policy towards North Korea. The Ulji Freedom Guardian joint exercise carried out by South Korea and the United States in the border area at that time was very dangerous because it involved strategic striking defense equipment belonging to the United States, making the situation seem like it was on the verge of war. "Their actions cannot be tolerated. We have asked the United States not to take such provocative actions. But they didn't care about our warnings, they went back to carrying out Ulji Freedom Guardian war games. "Finally, our government decided to demonstrate the military capabilities we have by planning an attack on Guam, an American Military Base," he said, adding that this was the first round of North Korea's response to the joint military exercises of South Korea and the United States as well as the first step of our army's military operations in the region. Pacific.

Furthermore, Ambassador An said that his party was closely observing the statements made by President Trump and South Korean President Moon Jaein. North Korea does not see any of Trump and Moon's policies as positive in order to find a good solution to the problems on the Korean Peninsula completely. "We are building a nuclear arsenal to defend our system and government from nuclear threats and the hostile policies of the United States implemented until now. "Our nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip at the dialogue or negotiation table aimed at disarming our arsenal," said Ambassador An again.

Regarding President Moon Jaein's leadership as a progressive figure who is expected to take new policies that are different from the two conservative South Korean presidents, Ambassador An said, in fact, what Moon Jae-in once said was that he would take a completely different policy from his two predecessors. not proven. From Moon Jae-in's attitude when the interview was conducted, North Korea could not see any intention to resolve the problems on the Korean Peninsula by prioritizing the position and interests of the Korean people. On the other hand, South Korea made relations between the two Koreas worse because it followed America's strategy.

"Moon Jaein visited the US and he said that North-South relations will proceed according to the framework of the agreement between South Korea and the US. His attitude and statements made many people lose hope. If he wants to truly improve relations between North and South, he must change the mindset. Although South Korea often says that it wants to create peace on the Korean Peninsula and unite the Korean people, their thoughts are not free from US control and influence. "This is the real problem," explained Ambassador An.

Ambassador An also said that North Korea actually does not want to go to war with any party. But if forced to go to war, he said again, North Korea would definitely win. Increasing military capacity and capability, including North Korea's nuclear weapons tests, is also placed in the context of preventing war or deterrent. There are many lessons, he continued, where a country that is weak and does not have sufficient strength is ultimately unable to maintain state sovereignty.

"If America chooses a dangerous option, we are also preparing to attack as the worst option. Whether there will be a war or not depends entirely on America's attitude," he stressed.

At a time when the world is worried about conditions on the Korean Peninsula, Ambassador An said that the North Korean people are not at all worried that war will happen. The North Korean people, said Ambassador An, are busy with various development programs being promoted by the government, and believe that North Korea has a strong and reliable government and armed forces that are also strong and able to face the worst possibilities, including invasion by other countries.

From Ambassador An's statement, it can be concluded that for North Korea their real opponent is the United States. In the eyes of North Korea, South Korea is nothing more than an instrument used or ridden by the United States to strengthen its dominance on the Korean Peninsula, including an instrument to suppress and defeat North Korea.

The mutual pressure shown by North Korea on the one hand and the United States using South Korea in the 2017-2018 period looks like the Chicken Run model in Game Theory. North Korea is moving at high speed towards the United States and South Korea. Likewise, the United States and South Korea are moving at high speed towards North Korea. Each party hopes to be the winner in this situation of mutual pressure, and that can only happen if the opposing party on the

other side reduces speed and then stops, or changes direction, to avoid a collision which could have fatal and deadly consequences.

In the critical situation in the 2017-2018 period, North Korea on the one hand and the United States and South Korea on the other apparently both “reduced speed and changed direction”. From previously confrontational to dialogical. The war of statements between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump that occurred throughout 2017 eased in 2018. This change in situation was more or less contributed by Moon Jaein’s role as mediator. North Korea and the United States agreed to reduce tensions and open space for dialogue with North Korea. In a speech at the end of 2017, President Moon Jaein invited Kim Jong Un to meet. Kim Jong Un answered this invitation in a speech at the beginning of 2018. Kim said he was ready to meet Moon. The change in attitude of the two highest leaders in their respective countries was followed by the formation of a joint team at the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, in February.

After a series of preliminary meetings, the Third Inter-Korea Summit was finally held on April 27 2018 in Panmunjom. In the “Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula” or “Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula” Kim Jong Un and Moon Jaein stated that a new era of peace had begun and there would be no more war on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas also agreed to immediately end long-standing divisions and confrontations, a legacy of the Cold War, by opening a new era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity, as well as to improve and cultivate inter-Korean relations in a more active manner. The declaration also mentioned joint efforts that the two Koreas would make to reduce acute military tensions and significantly eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the two Koreas will actively work together to build a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as a historic mission that cannot be postponed any further.

South Korean Ambassador to Indonesia Kim Changbeom, in an interview shortly after the Third Inter-Korean Summit took place, said that the meeting was only the beginning of a new chapter that the two Koreas were about to embark on. “We must continue our journey to achieve the ultimate goal, namely lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula,” he said.

Personally, Ambassador Kim has a special closeness to the Inter Korea issue. He was involved in many negotiations with North Korea. Including while serving in Jakarta between 2003 and 2005, Ambassador Kim was behind the meeting between North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Kimoon at the 2004 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Then, during the Second Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang in October In 2007, Ambassador Kim served as Director General of the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Maximum pressure from President Trump, according to Ambassador Kim, has contributed significantly to strategic changes on the Korean Peninsula. However, apart from that, there are

three other key factors, namely international solidarity which is manifested in various UN Security Council Resolutions that impose sanctions on North Korea, so that Pyongyang thinks more seriously about the need to change. Second, the consistency of South Korea's gestures and initiatives, especially President Moon. Without President Moon's political gestures that make the atmosphere warm and friendly, it is difficult to imagine North Korea and Kim Jong Un moving towards more strategic talks. The third key factor is Kim Jong Un's decision, who after successfully declaring North Korea as a country that has the capability to build nuclear weapons, decided to focus on the economic sector.

Ambassador Kim also acknowledged the role of multi-stakeholders, the main countries that are often involved in the issue of peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. "We know that the main and most important stakeholders in this dynamic are North Korea and South Korea. "But at the same time, I don't use the term intervention, we need cooperation and support from other stakeholders, such as the United States, China, Russia and also Japan," he said. He said Kim Jong Un's visit to China to meet with President Xi Jinping before the Singapore summit was a clear signal that North Korea needed support from China. Likewise with President Moon's visit to the United States to meet Donald J. Trump before the Singapore Summit in June 2018.

After the meeting at Panmunjom in April 2018, North Korea destroyed a number of nuclear facilities they owned. The destruction of these nuclear facilities is also an obligation that North Korea must carry out leading up to the meeting between Kim Jong Un and Donald J. Trump in June 2018 in Singapore. At the Singapore meeting in June 2018, Kim and Trump exchanged comprehensive and in-depth opinions on a number of issues related to the new relations between the two countries and building a lasting and strong peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Trump committed to providing security guarantees to North Korea, while Kim reaffirmed his commitment to carrying out the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Jong Un and Donald J. Trump met again in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. Unfortunately, this second meeting did not result in a written agreement. Kim Jong Un left the meeting room and refused to sign the documents that had been prepared on the table. Until now it is not clear the reasons behind Kim Jong Un's refusal. Information is circulating saying that Kim Jong Un cannot accept certain things mentioned in the document, as if these particular things had not been discussed in preparatory meetings before the summit in Hanoi. Other information says that Kim Jong Un deliberately did not sign the document as a signal of protest over the United States' delay in taking the action that North Korea wanted, namely reducing bilateral and multilateral sanctions. North Korea feels that it has done a lot to reach a new balance point, such as destroying its nuclear facilities, but the United States and South Korea have not done anything to offset the steps that North Korea has taken.

After the failure of the meeting in Hanoi, Moon Jaein rushed to facilitate an informal meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at Panmunjom on June 30 2019. Although it

was not official, it should be noted that this was the first meeting attended by three leaders from three countries with interests. strategic location on the Korean Peninsula.

There is an opinion that the triangular meeting in Panmunjom in June 2019 was an effort by the three leaders to convince the international community that the peace agenda on the Korean Peninsula was still on the right track. However, there are quite a few people who believe that unifying the Korean Peninsula is not an easy matter. Talks after talks that have been carried out by the leaders of the two Koreas as well as the leaders of North Korea and the United States in the period 2018 and 2019 are considered unable to guarantee the realization of reunification.

Regime changes in the United States in 2020 and in South Korea in 2022 contributed to the re-escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since the beginning of Yoon Sukyeol's conservative government in South Korea, the intensity of military cooperation with the United States has increased. Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, the annual military exercise between the United States and South Korea which was canceled by Donald Trump, is being held again.

“Of course, many will see and worry that this situation will worsen again, going back to the time before there was an agreement between Moon Jaein and Kim Jong Un. “Where the Kim government will again isolate itself and prioritize and prioritize the nuclear weapons program,” said South Korean Ambassador to Indonesia, Park Taesung in an interview with Researchers in April 2022. From January to March of that year, North Korea carried out this action 11 times. weapons tests and 15 missile launch, including the Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24, 2022.

“This is one of their (North Korea) actions to increase military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “This series of ICBM tests is not only worrying for South Korea but also countries in the region and the world in general,” said Ambassador Park again while regretting the statement by Kim Jong Un's younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, who reminded South Korea of North Korea's ability to develop nuclear weapons. Kim Yo Jong's statement was seen as a threat and has increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula, especially at a time when South Korea is waiting for a new government after the presidential election. Ambassador Park underlined that the launch of the Hwasong-17 ICBM violated the agreement between North Korea and South Korea regarding the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in addition to violating UN Security Council Resolutions.

Ambassador Park also said that it was difficult to anticipate whether relations between North Korea and South Korea would improve or worsen in the future. What is clear is that realizing peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is an optimal goal and must be realized by North Korea and South Korea because it has regional and international influence. This is a task that we must complete in order to create world peace.

On the other hand, North Korea does not feel guilty about the situation which has worsened again. North Korea actually feels that what they are doing again is a response to threats coming

from the policies of the conservative South Korean regime under President Yoon's administration which is strengthening military cooperation with the Joe Biden administration in the United States. Apart from that, Kim Jong Un also looked at opportunities to increase military cooperation with Russia amidst tensions between Russia and NATO as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meeting of President Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the East Russia's distance on September 13 2023 shows that North Korea and Russia have a new perspective in developing military relations between the two countries.

Analysis of the Two-Level Game of Korean Reunification

Foreign policy is the response given by each government in a country to events that occur in the international environment, especially events that are directly related to the interests of that country. In the study of two-level games developed by Putnam (1988), this phenomenon is referred to as linkage with the international environment or international entanglement. Apart from that, the response given by the government in a country is also influenced by domestic political dynamics or domestic entanglement. These two variables, international entanglement and domestic entanglement, are even related to each other because it is very possible that the character or idiosyncratic character of a leader in a country, whether resulting from the practice of an open or closed political system, is considered a problem and even a threat to other countries.

Likewise with the foreign policies of North Korea and South Korea regarding the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario, North Korea and South Korea have two choices, namely agreeing to reunification (yes) or not agreeing to reunification (no). At the time this research was conducted, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula was a constitutional task of both Koreas which was expressly stated in the constitutions of both North Korea and South Korea. However, the issue of reunification of the Korean Peninsula does not only belong to the two Koreas. The policy choices taken by North Korea and South Korea are greatly influenced by domestic political dynamics variables in both North Korea and South Korea and are closely related to dynamic variables in the international environment.

Domestic political variables in this study refer to internal dynamics both in North Korea and South Korea. In North Korea, which adheres to the Juche ideology and practices a well-controlled political system, the hereditary change of regime from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il and then to Kim Jong Un was not followed by changes in political policy, in fact there was continuity of political policy from one period of power to the next period of power. The Juche ideology developed by Kim Il Sung became the foundation for the Songun political policies developed by Kim Jong Il and the Byungjin political policies in the Kim Jong Un era.

Both Songun and Byungjin can be said to be derivatives or practices of Juche ideology with an emphasis on certain sectors. In the Kim Jong Il era, Songun's policy made the defense sector a top priority. Meanwhile, in the Kim Jong Un era, Byungjin's policy tried to create a

balance between development of the defense sector and development of the economic sector. In recent years, especially after the failed meeting in Hanoi in February 2019 between Kim Jong Un and Donald J. Trump which was followed by regime changes in the United States and in South Korea, development of the defense sector and economic sector in North Korea has occurred very significantly. Unfortunately, the Western world, including the media and observers of international politics, still pays greater attention to the various weapons tests carried out by North Korea, which make North Korea's face look more militaristic. Various developments in the economic sector carried out by North Korea as a derivative of the Byungjin policy in the Kim Jong Un era, such as the "Inmin Daejung" or "People First" and "20x10 Regional Development" policies, did not receive sufficient attention from the international community.

In a situation where the enemy levels up military capacity and capability, and also strengthens military cooperation with other countries using provocative scenarios, of course North Korea has very strong reasons to practice a closed and controlled political system based on the Juche, Songun and Byungjin philosophies. Due to the enormous pressure that North Korea faces from its enemies, building a defense sector is seen as a necessity and serves as a guarantee that North Korea does not become a "lame duck" and an "easy target" for their enemies. North Korea has learned from so many cases where countries that lack military capacity and capabilities can easily be destroyed by other countries.

Meanwhile, in South Korea, political dynamics that continue to develop and are dynamic have an influence on changes in political policy, including in this case foreign policy regarding the country's relations with North Korea. At the beginning of independence, South Korea was controlled by civilian figure Rhee Syngman who developed authoritarian political practices with a great anti-communist spirit. During his reign, there was absolutely no room for dialogue with North Korea. Rhee's era of civilian authoritarianism was followed by military dictatorship practiced by military figures Park Chunhee, Chun Doohwan and Roh Taewoo. They view North Korea as a threat that must be faced with military force.

Dialogue with North Korea was carried out on a limited scale and did not produce significant results. Significant political changes only occurred in 1998 in the era of Kim Daejung who represented the progressive-democratic group. Kim views North Korea as a dialogue partner to create peace on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Daejung's Sunshine policy was continued by his colleague Roh Moohyun. In the following era, the North Korean government was again controlled by conservative groups who saw North Korea as a source of threat. The space for dialogue with North Korea has shrunk again, while on the other hand, defense sector partnerships with two main allies, the United States and Japan, have been increased very significantly. After two terms in power, the era of conservative government ended and Moon Jaein continued, who inherited a progressive-democratic approach like Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun. The Moonshine policy developed by Moon brought very significant changes. Two Inter-Korean summits took place during that period, plus two United States-North Korea summits which more or less reduced

tensions and raised hopes for peace on the Korean Peninsula. But the Moonshine era did not last long. After that, the progressive-democratic government was replaced by a government controlled by conservative groups. President Yoon Seokyeol like other conservative leaders sees North Korea as a threat, and increases defense cooperation with South Korea's key allies.

The external or international environmental variables that influence the foreign policies of the two Koreas regarding reunification in this research refer to the role of countries that directly have interests in the Korean Peninsula. After the Second World War ended, the parties with the most interests in the Korean Peninsula were the two previously allied countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union had an influence on the Korean liberation group in the northern hemisphere led by Kim Il Sung, then the United States provided no small support to the anti-Japanese and anti-communist Rhee Syngman in the southern hemisphere. In the initial phase after the Second World War, it can be concluded that in order to reach the highest positions in their political careers, both Kim Il Sung and Rhee Syngman received very significant support from their respective international patrons. At the same time, in the context of the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective circles needed local friends who could act as proxies and extensions of their power on the Korean Peninsula.

After the Cold War ended, marked by the destruction of the Soviet Union in December 1991, North Korea lost its patrons and experienced significant turbulence. The United States took advantage of North Korea's vacuum of foreign influence by offering economic assistance while trying to dampen North Korea's desire to develop nuclear energy as an alternative. The United States offers assistance in building a hydroelectric power plant to meet North Korea's energy needs. This approach was disrupted after Kim Il Sung died and the new leader who replaced him, Kim Jong Il, felt he had to adopt a new policy to ward off the possibility of occupation of North Korea by another power for any reason, including economic assistance. The increasing intensity of relations between the United States and South Korea's conservative leaders at that time became a factor that increasingly convinced North Korea that strengthening its defense sector was the best way to prevent foreign occupation. The change in regime in the United States from the Barack Obama administration which developed a policy of "strategic silence" to the more flexible Donald J. Trump administration provided an opportunity for the Korean Peninsula and the East Asian region to breathe a little easier. Moreover, at the same time, South Korea is also led by a progressive government which is willing to open up quite a wide space for dialogue with North Korea.

The United States has always placed the issue of peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula in the same basket as the issue of denuclearization. In other words, denuclearization is an absolute requirement for the United States to support both issues that are important for the two Koreas. The United States' attitude is in line with the attitude of two countries in the North Korean circle, namely the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, which have always

provided support for UN sanctions against North Korea regarding Pyongyang's development of weapons and nuclear programs.

After the summit with South Korea in April 2018 and ahead of the summit with the United States in Singapore in June 2018, North Korea was willing to destroy its nuclear facilities to show its faith and desire to create peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, peace talks with the United States stalled after a summit in Hanoi in February 2019 did not sign any agreement. There was no official explanation why Kim Jong Un did not sign the document that was placed on the table at his meeting with Donald J. Trump in Hanoi. Researchers assess that Kim Jong Un's decision smacks of protest at the United States which has not taken action to show its intention towards peace as North Korea did by destroying its nuclear facilities. Throughout the talks which started from mid-2018 until the meeting in Hanoi, the United States continued to pressure North Korea economically. One example of this pressure is the case of the North Korean coal carrier, MV Wise Honest, which was captured in the waters of East Kalimantan, Indonesia, in April 2018.¹ After the captain of the MV Wise Honest was sentenced to a fine of IDR 400 million by the Balikpapan District Court in November 2018, United States authorities began an investigation into the MV Wise Honest which was deemed to have violated international sanctions. For the United States, this is the largest North Korean ship the United States has ever captured. According to information obtained by researchers, the United States offered an exchange between the MV Wise Honest and the American spy ship, Pueblo, which was captured by North Korea in January 1968 and is still in North Korea and has been used as a trophy of America's victory and defeat museum. Union. North Korea of course rejected this request.²

North Korea's communication with America worsened after the regime change occurred in the United States in 2020. Joe Biden, who replaced Donald J. Trump, chose to continue Barack Obama's policy of strategic silence. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased very significantly after Yoon Sukyeol from the conservative group came to power in South Korea.

International relations observer from Padjadjaran University, DR. Teuku Rezasyah, in an interview with researchers, said that the influence of the international environment on the situation on the Korean Peninsula is very significant. Especially after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. "Psychological obstacles are one of the problems besides being afraid of fighting their host.

¹ The author received information about the Wise Honest coal ship case from the North Korean Ambassador to Indonesia, An Kwang Il. The North Korean embassy initially did not want to raise this issue to the surface because it was worried that it would affect the planned meeting of Kim Jong Un and Moon Jaein at the end of April 2018 and other talks that had been planned afterwards. The North Korean embassy is also being careful in front of the Indonesian public because it does not want this case to disrupt the participation of North Korea and South Korea who formed a joint team for three sports at the Asian Games in August 2018.

² Documents regarding this case can also be seen on the United States Ministry of Justice website via <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-forfeiture-north-korean-cargo-vessel> and Opiniojuris.org via <http://opiniojuris.org/2020/06/23/revisiting-international-cooperation-on-illicit-trafficking-by-sea-indonesia-and-the-final-voyage-of-the-m-v-wise-honest-part-i/>

North Korea is afraid of China, South Korea is afraid of the United States. “Especially in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian and Russian crises, where North Korea must side with Russia,” he said.

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, these domestic and international factors ultimately influence the foreign policy choices of North Korea and South Korea regarding reunification. In the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea on January 15 2024, Kim Jong Un, speaking in his capacity as President of the State Affairs Commission, asked North Korea to forget its ideals of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. He asked that the North Korean Constitution be amended again and remove all parts related to reunification efforts. This request was the culmination of Kim Jong Un’s disappointment with the hostile policies implemented by South Korea and the United States. Kim said that the Korean Workers’ Party, the government and the people of North Korea have shown extraordinary generosity and patience and have always sincerely viewed South Korea as a fellow countryman. So far, North Korea has been willing to honestly discuss national reunification as a major goal.

“But the final conclusion from this bitter reality is, we cannot pursue the path of national recovery and reunification together with the ROK (South Korean) clans who adopted confrontation with our Republic as their policy. They dream of the ‘collapse of our government’ and ‘unification through absorption’, and no longer have the consciousness of being fellow countrymen. “They became crueller and more arrogant in a crazy confrontational frenzy,” said Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un added that due to the Yoon government’s confrontational maneuvers, the relationship between North Korea and South Korea had become a relationship between two hostile countries, no longer a relationship between two brothers. Kim said that terms in the North Korean constitution regarding reunification, such as “the northern half, independence, peaceful reunification and comprehensive national unity” also needed to be abolished.

On that occasion, Kim Jong Un made clear once again what he called the revolutionary nature of North Korea’s efforts to strengthen its independent military capabilities, which North Korea firmly maintains as its lifeblood and is not affected by any changes in the situation. The military power developed by North Korea is not a means of preemptive strike to achieve unilateral “reunification by force of arms”, but rather for self-defense.

“In today’s world where the law of the jungle applies, and our country is located above a hot spot where the danger of war has persisted for decades, having military power is a necessity to defend the fate of the country and nation as well as a historical task that must be accepted as destiny,” he said.

North Korea will never launch a war unilaterally without provocation from the enemy. Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un has reminded hostile parties not to misjudge his statement and perceive it as North Korea’s weakness or North Korea’s unwillingness to go to war.

“We do not want war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it. There was no reason to choose war, and therefore, no intention to fight unilaterally. But once war becomes the reality we face, we will never try to avoid it, and we will take perfect and swift action to defend our sovereignty, people’s security and right to life. This war would utterly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and end its existence. And this will cause a very devastating disaster and defeat for the US. Our military capabilities, already prepared to do just that, are being rapidly updated. “If the enemy incites war, our Republic will punish the enemy firmly by deploying all its military power, including nuclear weapons,” said Kim Jong Un again.

The day after Kim Jong Un’s statement before the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea, President Yoon Sukyeol responded at his government’s cabinet meeting in Seoul. Yoon regretted Kim Jong Un’s move and called it an attempt by the regime in North Korea to ignore the history and interests of the North Korean people. Yoon also criticized North Korea’s artillery test fired into the Yellow Sea in early January 2024 and the launch of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) two days earlier. He also threatened to carry out multiple retaliations if North Korea continued to provoke South Korea. In addition, Yoon expressed his desire to provide support to help North Korean defectors settle in South Korea. The Unification Ministry was instructed to set a special day for defectors from North Korea.

After that, on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Brazil, in February 2024, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Taeyul, United States Minister of Foreign Affairs Antony Blinken, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa since Cho held a limited meeting to, among other things, discuss issues in Korean Peninsula. and North Korea’s attitude has hardened again, especially after North Korea established significant cooperation with Russia following the meeting between Kim Jong Un and Valdimir Putin in September 2023.

CONCLUSION

The issue of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which has been going on for seven decades since the Second World War ended, is influenced by the dynamics of the domestic environment of North Korea and South Korea and cannot be separated from the involvement of large countries with interests in the region. This is in line with the logic of two-level games (The Logic of Two-Level Games) developed by Putnam (1988) which says that a country’s foreign policy has an entanglement with domestic dynamics and the international environment which are equally significant and even influence each other. one another.

In general, it can be concluded that initially the two Koreas had relatively the same attitude towards the issue of reunification, namely that both would fight for reunification through peaceful means. This is stated in the Constitution of each Korea, as well as in various documents produced at various meetings between the two that discussed the prospects for peace. Thus, if it only involves the two Koreas, Korean reunification can be concluded to be easier to carry out. Of course, even

though it is said to be easier, the differences in ideology and political systems between North Korea and South Korea are not simple, and to reduce the space for differences requires extra hard efforts.

The issue of reunification of the Korean Peninsula becomes increasingly complex when the dynamics of the international environment are taken into consideration. The international community, both the United States and Japan and other countries in the South Korea circle, as well as the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the North Korea circle, link the issue of reunification as a form of peace between the two Koreas with the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This means that for the international community the reunification of the Korean Peninsula is only possible in the future if North Korea is willing to cooperate and comply with international law, in this case remaining bound to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The problem is, for North Korea, which feels insecure and threatened by the international environment, especially the alliance of South Korea and the United States, arming itself with nuclear weapons has become a kind of necessity. With adequate defense, including having nuclear weapons, North Korea is confident that the country will not experience occupation by other countries as has been experienced by many countries that do not have adequate national defense.

But even in tense times this does not mean that North Korea has never opened the door to dialogue to achieve peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the period 2018 and 2019 the international community witnessed North Korea's willingness to involve itself in peace talks with South Korea and the United States. The Third Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018 and the Fourth Inter-Korean Summit in September 2018 as well as the First United States-North Korea Summit in Singapore in June 2018 and the Second United States-North Korea Summit in Hanoi in February 2019 are nevertheless quite promising although not yet can end the conflict that has been going on since the Korean War ended. Regime changes in South Korea and the United States brought North Korea's relations with South Korea and the international environment to worsen again, until North Korea finally ended its dream of reunification of the Korean Peninsula in January 2024.

North Korea's decision to forget and even eliminate reunification from the political dictionary is a more reliable step. Furthermore, the researcher recommends harmonious and peaceful neighborly life between North Korea and South Korea or peaceful co-existence. Of course, this cannot be built in one night. Political and diplomatic work that not only involves the two Koreas but also the international community is urgently needed. Creating peace on the Korean Peninsula is not only North Korea's obligation, but is shared by the two Koreas and the international community. In other words, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not only North Korea's obligation, but also the obligation of the international community, especially countries that over the past few decades have tried to exert significant influence on the Korean Peninsula. Creating a Korean Peninsula that is peaceful and free from nuclear weapons and gigantic and provocative displays of power must be a joint work agenda of the international community that is carried out consistently.

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