

## THE STANCE OF THE AL-ALI TRIBE TOWARDS MANDATORY CONSCRIPTION (1921-1938)

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### Abstract

Iraqi figures, especially tribal ones, have received attention from some researchers, shedding light on their role in the country's events. However, there are figures that did not receive the required attention, one of them being Sakban Al-Ali. He played a significant role in the events of Iraq, particularly in his stance on mandatory conscription from 1921 to 1938. He initially declared his rejection of this law, as its enforcement would force the members of his tribe to join the army. He condemned it in most sessions of the parliament, justifying that its implementation would negatively impact their social and economic conditions. He presented many petitions to King Ghazi, requesting the cancellation of the mandatory conscription law.

Keywords: Sakban Al-Ali, conscription, King Ghazi, petitions, parliament

### Introduction:

This research examines Sakban Al-Ali's stance on mandatory conscription from 1921 to 1938. From the outset, he expressed his discontent with the enforcement of this law due to its negative impact on their economic and social conditions and interests. He consistently condemned the decision to implement mandatory conscription in all sessions of the parliament. Simultaneously, he submitted various objections to the law.

This research relies on a collection of documents preserved in the House of Books and Documents, particularly the files of the royal court and the minutes of the parliament sessions. Additionally, the study references a range of university theses, dissertations, Arabic books, published research, and several newspapers. These sources played a significant role in enriching the research with information.

### Sakban Al-Ali's Stance on Mandatory Conscription 1921-1938:

Mandatory conscription is considered one of the most significant issues that occupied the minds of political and national leaders in Iraq. This law, whose issuance dates back to the era of Midhat Pasha in 1869, was of great concern to them<sup>(i)</sup>. When the British authorities took control of Iraq through the High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, he did not attempt to impose mandatory conscription on Iraq throughout his tenure from 1914 to 1921. On January 6, 1921, he proposed the formation of an Iraqi army consisting of 15,000 soldiers. The government of Abdul Rahman Al-Naqib, in its first session on May 26, 1921, passed the Temporary Volunteering Law for the Iraqi Army, which came with the following conditions:-<sup>(ii)</sup>.

1. Volunteers for the army should be between the ages of 18 and 40.
2. The period of service is set at two and a half years for infantry and three years for cavalry.
3. Training will be conducted by British officers, following the model of the British army.
4. The main headquarters of the army will be in Baghdad, and multiple recruitment centers will be established in<sup>(iii)</sup> various Iraqi provinces.

The actual training of the Iraqi army began under the leadership of Jafar Al-Askari on April 28, 1921. When he assumed the position of Minister of Defense in the first Naqib government, and due to the fact that real power was in the hands of the British authorities, he began to take the initial steps in forming the nucleus of the Iraqi army. He established the Iraqi Military School on July 24, 1921, believing that conscription would enable Iraq to build a strong national army with a size ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers. However, this law quickly faced significant opposition from the British authorities, who argued that they were responsible for defending Iraq. This opposition coincided with the issuance of orders to close the military school on January 3, 1923, citing the financial crisis facing the first Naqib government.<sup>(iv)</sup>

King Faisal I<sup>(v)</sup> showed exceptional interest in the army, believing that one of the primary tasks of independence was to have a military force that could protect the country's borders. He emphasized that the army was the backbone of nation-building. He viewed it as inappropriate for Iraq to rely entirely on Britain for its defense. Therefore, in the government of the first Saadoun formed on September 18, 1922, Minister of Defense Nuri Said<sup>(vi)</sup> proposed the necessity of implementing mandatory conscription to defend Iraq's external borders, especially after the southern and western regions were subjected to Wahhabi attacks.<sup>(vii)</sup>

As a result, on December 16, 1923, Nuri Said submitted an official memorandum to the Cabinet, outlining that Iraq's proximity to Turkey on one side, Iran on another, and the vast desert expanse bordering Arabia and Syria on a third side, coupled with open borders with some countries, necessitated the government's reliance on a strong national army capable of safeguarding its borders. In response, the Saadoun Ministry issued a decision on June 11, 1923, to implement mandatory conscription and increase the Iraqi army to 6,000 soldiers, along with an augmentation of the defense ministry's budget. However, this decision remained merely ink on paper, due to several reasons -:<sup>(viii)</sup>

1. One of the primary tasks assigned to the Saadoun Ministry was to ensure the success of the Constituent Assembly elections. However, the legislation of the conscription law posed a hindrance to the elections.
2. Iraqis did not accept the conscription system, as they believed that serving in the army meant serving for Britain. Therefore, the government of Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun failed to pass the law because it did not align with the country's current circumstances.

The idea of mandatory conscription was proposed in the Constituent Assembly, following the attacks suffered by the Kirkuk brigade from the Assyrians<sup>(ix)</sup>. On May 4, 1924, a number of deputies in the Constituent Assembly, led by Sakan Al-Ali<sup>(x)</sup>, inquired about the measures taken by the Ministry in response to those attacks. Prime Minister Jafar Al-Askari answered that there was a need to establish a national army to defend Iraq and its independence. However, Britain was obstructing this. He stated that having a strong army was one of the prerequisites for "complete successful independence," but the "incomplete responsibility" was what was preventing the realization of this demand.<sup>(xi)</sup>

Amidst heated debates within the Constituent Assembly regarding the mandatory conscription law, Yassin Al-Hashimi<sup>(xii)</sup> proposed the implementation of mandatory conscription and making

the defense of Iraq an obligation for all citizens, provided that its methods and forms be outlined according to a specific law. However, Sakan Al-Ali and several deputies from the agreement objected to this proposal, arguing that conscription is a right of the parliament and not within the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly.

Yassin Al-Hashimi returned to speak, reminding the assembly of the urgency of the Iraqi situation due to Turkish threats aimed at annexing the Mosul brigade from Iraq. He expressed reservations about the "fabricated strength" of Iraq and stated that mandatory conscription was the first step towards independence.

Jafar Al-Askari supported what Yassin Al-Hashimi mentioned and believed that it was "just and fair" to include a provision in the fundamental law stipulating mandatory conscription .<sup>(xiii)</sup>

Indeed, the mandatory conscription law was introduced during the first sessions of the Parliament held on October 8, 1925. It was brought up during the discussion of the general budget law for the fiscal year 1925, specifically in the section concerning the armed forces. The committee's report recommended the implementation of mandatory conscription, as it would save approximately twenty percent of the army's expenses. However, this was met with strong opposition and rejection from the deputies of the agreement.

Sakan Al-Ali emphasized that the army's forces play a paramount role in safeguarding the nation's borders from any aggression. However, he objected to the formation of an Iraqi army during the period of British administration. Sakan Al-Ali's opinion closely aligned with that of Mr. Abdul-Mahdi Al-Muntafiqi to a large extent his opinion was that the presence of an army should <sup>xv(xiv)</sup> coincide with the presence of independence, not with the presence of the British, so that the people of Iraq would feel that this army's purpose is to defend their homeland and preserve its independence, rather than safeguarding British interests<sup>(xvi)</sup> It seems that the political situation in Iraq and the dual governance hindered the Iraqi people from embracing this step .The dispute between the government of Jafar Al-Askari II on November 21, 1926, and the High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs<sup>(xvii)</sup> escalated over the implementation of mandatory conscription. Dobbs made it clear that if this law were enacted, the British government would refrain from providing any assistance to support this measure. At the same time, he exerted all forms of pressure on King Faisal I to withdraw the draft bill from the parliament. As a result, King Faisal asked Al-Askari to withdraw the bill from the parliament. Thus, the Al-Askari government failed to achieve one of its most important ministerial goals. <sup>(xviii)</sup>

From here, it becomes clear that the reason for Britain's opposition to the mandatory conscription law was to compel Iraq to rely entirely on the British military stationed in Iraq and to undermine the potential for the creation of a strong Iraqi army that the Iraqi government could depend on.

Some opponents of Jafar Al-Askari's ministry tried to cast doubt on its efforts to implement the mandatory conscription law. Deputy Mohammed Baqir Al-Shubeibi stated that the ministry aimed to: "Impose a military character on the country as the Federalists did in Turkey. There is no mandatory conscription, or else the clash of swords and the glitter of medals on the chests of officers, with a daily call to arms. It has become commonplace to see groups of peasants marching like troops, leaving their flourishing farms for those desolate barracks. " ". Sakan Al-Ali objected to the mandatory conscription bill, stating, "There is nothing to prevent the noble tribes from

staging loud protests against this mandatory conscription bill." He emphasized that it would be better for the government to focus on urban projects rather than the military, and to address the most important issues in Iraqi society, particularly poverty, need, and deprivation suffered by the majority of the Iraqi people. He strongly insisted that more financial allocations should be directed to the Ministry of Health in order to open hospitals to combat the epidemics that have spread throughout various parts of the country .<sup>(xix)</sup> .

It seems that the opponents of the mandatory conscription law do not realize the value of having an Iraqi military force on their own soil. Additionally, implementing this law would likely adversely affect their economic interests, as most of the labor force in the fields consists of young individuals. On the other hand, for tribes, the youth constitute a supporting force in case of invasions or conflicts with other tribes. Therefore, applying this law would potentially disrupt the social standing of the tribe . Since then, the mandatory conscription law entered a period of dormancy, which ended with the convening of the second electoral session on May 19, 1928. This was approximately four months after the formation of the third ministry under Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun,<sup>(xx)</sup> which emphasized in its agenda the adoption of the mandatory conscription law. However, the Saadoun ministry quickly faced opposition from the British side, who insisted on the same negative approach towards the mandatory conscription project. The Saadoun ministry saw that it was not possible to re-submit the project to the parliament. They were forced to postpone it to another opportunity, hoping for consensus between the government and the parliament.

Among the reasons that led Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun not to re-present the conscription project to the parliament was his fear that it might lead to a division in the parliament and political upheavals.<sup>(xxi)</sup> .

Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun formed the fourth ministry on September 19, 1929. The ministry outlined its agenda, which included the rapid implementation of the general mandatory conscription law. It also declared its intention to end the British government's responsibility for defending Iraq and implementing mandatory conscription. The ministry took various measures, such as abolishing the formations of the General Command Agency and establishing the Army Staff, returning public authorities to the Ministry of Defense. These measures were aimed at reducing British influence in the Iraqi army.

Despite these efforts, the Saadoun ministry did not achieve what it had promised. The ministry was dissolved after the suicide of Abdul-Muhsin<sup>(xxii)</sup> Al-Saadoun on October 13, 1930.<sup>(xxiii)</sup> .

Regardless of the circumstances, during the period from 1930 to 1931, the mandatory conscription bill did not make significant progress. The main reason for this was the termination of the mandate and Iraq's entry into the League of Nations in 1932. This issue became the primary concern for the Iraqi government and its politicians. As a result, their stance on the conscription bill aligned with the British position. Therefore, the Iraqi government agreed with the British opinion to postpone presenting the mandatory conscription issue to the parliament until Iraq became a member of the League of Nations.<sup>(xxiv)</sup> . Nuri al-Said justified their shift away from supporting the conscription bill on the grounds of an economic crisis. He argued that its implementation would cause significant damage to the agricultural sector due to the reduction in the number of available laborers. Additionally, he cited the opposition of the tribes to this project as a contributing factor.<sup>(xxv)</sup> .

To activate the mandatory conscription bill, a conference was held on May 20, 1932, at the Royal Court. It was attended by King Faisal I, Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari, General Robinson, the British advisor to the Ministry of Defense, and Cornwallis, the Deputy High Commissioner.

In this conference, Nuri al-Said presented a project aimed at enhancing the defensive capabilities by introducing new units and organizing the air force. He emphasized the need to strengthen the army in order to suppress the disturbances occurring in the north and south of Iraq. However, Nuri al-Said's call for mandatory conscription was quickly met with significant opposition from General Robinson. He clarified that the purpose of the meeting was to increase the army's strength and not to discuss the mandatory conscription project.<sup>(xxvi)</sup> It's noteworthy that Nuri al-Said's stance on conscription changed quite suddenly. King Faisal I expressed surprise at Nuri al-Said's abandonment of the idea of implementing this law and asked him for an explanation. Nuri al-Said affirmed that his intention was to balance between expanding the army and working on other projects.<sup>(xxvii)</sup>

It's important to highlight the reason behind Nuri al-Said's change in stance regarding the mandatory conscription project. It was found that the issue of independence was of utmost importance, as achieving independence would establish a national army capable of protecting its territory and maintaining its sovereignty.

The mandatory conscription bill remained a subject of contention between its opponents and supporters on one side, and the British administration on the other. Successive governments were unable to issue it until the first cabinet under Jamil Al-Madfai was formed on October 9, 1933, under the title "National Defense Law" or "Mandatory Conscription Law". This was especially true after the Assyrian Rebellion, which the army managed to suppress. However, the death of King Faisal I on September 7, 1933, postponed its implementation.<sup>(xxviii)</sup>

After the first cabinet under Jamil Al-Madfai presented the National Defense Law to the parliament on January 4, 1934, he clarified, "The law is now in your hands. If you wish, you can reject it, and if you wish, you can approve it. However, what I hope from you is not to miss the opportunity today to decide on a matter that will preserve the nation's existence in the best way. Such serious incidents occur once in the history of nations. I am confident that you will record this paternal pride, which future generations will acknowledge with gratitude and appreciation".<sup>(xxix)</sup> As soon as the Speaker of the Parliament announced the agenda of the session, voices rose, and desks were pounded, demanding to speak. Many deputies called for the formation of a strong Iraqi army capable of maintaining independence. When the bill was put to a vote, it was unanimously accepted.<sup>(xxx)</sup>

The efforts of the second cabinet under Yasin al-Hashimi on March 17, 1935, resulted in the implementation of the mandatory conscription law on June 12, 1935.<sup>(xxxi)</sup> When the royal decree, Decision No. 237, was issued for the implementation of the National Defense Law No. 9 of the year 1934,<sup>(xxxii)</sup> Afterwards, recruitment centers quickly spread across the country to receive young men and transport them to training centers. The following matters were included:-<sup>(xxxiii)</sup>

- 1- Setting the age of those obligated for military service at the age of nineteen and above.

- 2- Determining the service period to be ten years as follows:
  - a. First phase: Basic service, with a duration of one and a half years for infantry, and two years for technical and cavalry units, excluding training.
  - b. Second phase: First reserve service, with a duration of four years and two months for infantry, three years and a half for cavalry, and three years and eight months for technicians.
  - 3- c. Third phase: Second reserve service, with a duration of four years for all units.
- 4- The obligated individual can be exempted from basic service by paying a cash substitute of 30 dinars, provided that they complete the training duration.<sup>(xxxiv)</sup>.

The legislation of this law was met with strong opposition from many tribes. In the south, implementing this law directly led to numerous tribal uprisings. On May 5, 1935, Sheikh Sakban Al-Ali and the members of his tribe declared their refusal to comply with the compulsory military service provisions. They called on the tribes of Al-Ghuraf to join them and prevented the obligated individuals from heading to the recruitment centers. Soon, many other tribes that opposed the law joined them. These tribes gathered in front of the administration building in the center of Nasiriyah, expressing their refusal to enlist through chants. However, they found no receptive ear from the appointed administrator.<sup>(xxxv)</sup>.

On May 7, 1935, Sheikh Sakban Al-Ali held a meeting in collaboration with Sheikh Muhan Al-Khair and Khayoun Al-Ubaid with the tribes that opposed the compulsory military service law. Their aim was to present petitions and protests to King Ghazi, requesting the repeal of the law or the exemption of tribal leaders and their sons from mandatory service. The Royal Court forwarded these petitions to the Council of Ministers, who responded by stating that the provisions of the compulsory military service law were explicit, and there were no legal grounds for exempting tribal leaders or their sons from the law.<sup>(xxxvi)</sup>.

At the same time, a meeting took place between the administrator of the Mutanniqq district and Sheikh Sakban Al-Ali. The administrator explained that the foundation for legislating this law was to safeguard the independence of the country and protect its land. He emphasized that it would not harm the farmers or their agricultural lands. He emphasized that protecting the country was a sacred duty that fell upon every individual residing on its soil. He also assured Sheikh Sakban Al-Ali that if the tribes of Al-Gharaaf continued to oppose the government, it would only bring destruction and sabotage to their lands. There would be no objection for the government to deploy its military units to quell the rebellious movements of the tribes. Faced with this, Sheikh Sakban Al-Ali and the rest of the rebellious tribes reluctantly yielded to the government's orders and agreed to the compulsory military service law.<sup>(xxxvii)</sup>.

In order to implement the compulsory military service law, the government utilized various methods of persuasion and intimidation to convince the people. As the days went by and the people realized the importance of this law, they began to welcome it. In 1938, the National Defense Law No. 40 was introduced, which included some significant amendments to matters outlined in the National Defense Law No. 9 of 1934. These amendments included extending the period of service in the army to 20 years instead of 10, and increasing the cash allowance to 50 dinars instead of 30 dinars.<sup>(xxxviii)</sup>.

It is evident from the foregoing that Sakan Al-Ali opposed the compulsory military service law because most members of his tribe rely entirely on agricultural production. Imposing compulsory service leads to a reduction in the workforce, resulting in lower production. This contradicts the economic interests of the tribe. Additionally, this law has its drawbacks as it does not leave room for individual freedom but rather forces individuals into military service. Moreover, the duration of service was excessively long.

#### Conclusion:

It can be inferred from Sakan Al-Ali's opposition to the compulsory military service law that there are several reasons for his stance:

1. The implementation of the compulsory military service law would harm their economic interests, as a large number of tribal members rely on agricultural land. This law would lead to a significant portion of the workforce being diverted to national service.
2. The application of the compulsory military service law would also have adverse effects on their social interests. The majority of the youth in the tribes are considered a supporting force during conflicts or clashes with other tribes. This would lead to a destabilization of their social standing among the tribes.
3. This law does not leave room for individual freedom but rather enforces military service. Additionally, the duration of service was<sup>xxxix</sup> excessively long.

#### Foot notes

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<sup>i</sup> Medhat Pasha: He was born in Istanbul in 1822. He was appointed in 1860 as governor of Nis and showed competence in it. Then he was appointed governor of Tufa in 1864 for a period of three years. He then returned to Istanbul to occupy the position of head of the State Shura for one year, after which he was transferred as governor of Baghdad in 1869. As a result of a dispute between him and the Grand Vizier at the time, Mahmoud Nedim Pasha, Midhat left Baghdad and an order was issued appointing him as governor of Edirne. However, in an interview with Sultan Abdul Aziz, he was able to convince Sultan Abdul Aziz to remove Mahmoud Nedim from the leadership, and then convinced him in the same interview that he was worthy of this. Medhat Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier for the first time in 1872. He was tried by order of Sultan Abdul Hamid II on charges of involvement in the assassination of his uncle, Sultan Abdul Aziz. He was sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life and he was exiled to Taif, where he died in 1884. For more, see: Medhat Pasha, *Medhat Pasha's Memoirs*, Alexandria, 2019; Jamil Musa Al-Najjar, *The Ottoman Administration in the Baghdad Province*, Cairo 2008, pp. 10-22.

<sup>ii</sup> Anwar Nasser Hassan, The position of the Iraqi tribes on the compulsory conscription law, *Journal of Arts, College of Education, University of Baghdad*, Issue: 102, 2009, pp. 168-169..

(4) Jaafar Al-Askari: He was born in 1885 in Baghdad. He graduated from the Military School in Istanbul in 1904. He was appointed Minister of Defense in Abdul Rahman Al-Naqib's first ministry, then he was appointed Prime Minister of the Iraqi Government in 1923, then Minister Negotiator in London in 1925, then Prime Minister of the Iraqi Government in 1926. He held many ministerial and governmental positions until he was assassinated on October 29, 1936. For more, see: Jaafar Al-Askari, *Memoirs of Jaafar Al-*

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Askari, edited and presented by: Najda Fathi Safwa, London, 1988, pp. 174-25; Alaa Jassim Muhammad, the previous source, pp. 7-198

<sup>iv</sup>D.K.W., Royal Court Files, File No. 3297/3205805, Army Formations 1923, 63, p. 66..

(4)King Faisal I: He was born in the city of Taif in 1883. In 1916, Sharif Hussein announced his revolution against the Ottomans. He led the Arab army to liberate Damascus from the grip of the Ottoman army. He formed an Arab government there based on Britain's promises to allow the Arabs independence, and on March 8, 1918, he was crowned king. Over Syria, and at the Cairo Conference in March 1921, Britain nominated him as king on the throne of Iraq until his death on September 7, 1933. For more, see: Abdul Majeed Kamel Al-Tikriti, King Faisal and his role in establishing the Iraqi state 1921-1933, Baghdad, 1991; Kazem Nehme, King Faisal I, the English, and Independence, Beirut, 1988

(5)Nouri Al-Saeed: He was born in Baghdad in 1889. He graduated from the Military School in Istanbul in 1906. He participated in the Hejaz Revolution in 1916. He returned to Iraq in the fall of 1920. He became Minister of Defense in the first ministry of Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun. He held the position of Prime Minister several times. In addition to some government positions, in 1949 he asked the Ministry of the Interior to allow him to establish the Constitutional Union Party, which was granted on October 24, 1949. His life ended following the revolution of July 14, 1958 in Iraq. For more, see: Suad Raouf Shubar Muhammad, Nuri Al-Saeed and his role in Iraqi politics 1932-1945, Baghdad, 1988; Laila Yassin Hassan Al-Amir, Nuri Al-Saeed and his role in the Baghdad Pact and its impact on Iraqi-Arab relations 1946-1958, supervised by: Farouk Saleh Al-Omar, Baghdad, 2003.

<sup>vii</sup> Abdul Razzaq Ahmed Al-Nusairi, Nuri Al-Saeed and his role in Iraqi politics until 1932, 2nd edition, Beirut, 1988, p. 134.

<sup>viii</sup>) (Lutfi Jaafar Faraj, Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun and his political role in the contemporary political history of Iraq, Baghdad, 1988, p. 287..

(8)Assyrians: It is difficult to determine the origin of the Assyrians, despite the many opinions about their origin, but the most appropriate opinion indicating their origin is the opinion that says that they are the remnants of the Assyrian empire, and that an Assyrian cleric named (Isha Dawud) took up the call in the second half of the nineteenth century. To the Nestorian Christian doctrine after rejecting Catholicism, he and his followers announced his separation from the Catholic Church, and took the title of Saint Simeon after Saint Simeon, one of Christ's disciples. For more, see: Riyad Rashid Naji Al-Haidari, The Assyrians in Iraq 1918-1936, unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1973, pp. 10-26.

(9)Sakban Al-Ali: He was born in the city of Nasiriyah in 1892. He carried the banner of resistance to the British from 1914-1920. He declared his support for the monarchy in Iraq. He became a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1924, then he became a deputy to the Muntafiq Brigade in the Parliament for several parliamentary terms. He died in 1966. . For more, see: Mujahid Munthir Munshid, research on the lineage of Khafajah to Adam, London, 2015; Ali Nasser Hussein, Sheikhs of the Al-Muntafiq Brigade in British Documents (a study of the history of the Al-Muntafiq clans from the late Ottoman era until the end of King Faisal I 1933), Baghdad, 2008, pp. 148-150

<sup>xi</sup> Collection of notes of the Iraqi Constituent Assembly of 1924, Part 1, pp. 179-185.

(11)Yassin Al-Hashimi: He was born in Baghdad in 1884. He completed his studies at the military school in Istanbul in 1922. He returned to Iraq and participated in the first ministry of Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun. He became the trustee of Al-Muntafiq and Minister of Transportation and Works. He formed his first ministry from 1924-1925, and after his resignation. He turned to the opposition and had a position against the 1930 treaty. He formed his second ministry in 1935-1936. He died in Damascus in 1937. For more see: Sami Abdul Hafez Al-Qaisi, Yassin Al-Hashimi and his impact on the contemporary history of Iraq 1922-1936, Baghdad, 2013.

<sup>xiii</sup> (Collection of notes of the Iraqi Constituent Assembly of 1924, Part 2, pp. 1026-1032.

(12) Abd al-Mahdi al-Muntafiki: Mr. Abd al-Mahdi bin Hassan bin Nasser was born in the city of Shatrah in 1890. He was a person knowledgeable in science. He was one of the most prominent figures opposed to the occupation and participated in its resistance, especially in the twentieth revolution. He became one of the prominent members of the Independence Guard Association, and became one of the deputies. Al-Muntafiq, and he held several government positions, and he died in 1971. For more, see: Muayyad Shaker Kadhim Al-Tai, Al-Sayyid Abdul Mahdi and his political role in Iraq, Master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 2000.

(13) Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, previous source, pp. 81-95.

(14) Henry Dobbs: He is Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, of Canadian origin. He was born in Britain in 1871. He graduated from the University of Oxford. After graduating, he joined the Government of India. He rose through government positions until he became High Commissioner to Iraq for the period 1923-1929, after which he was retired. He died in 1934. For more, see: Inaam Mahdi Ali Al-Salman, The Impact of Henry Dobbs on Iraqi Politics 1923-1929, PhD thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1997.

(15) Abdul Razzaq Al-Hasani, History of the Iraqi Ministries, vol. 3, Baghdad, 1988, pp. 81-83.

(16) A personal interview with Sheikh Amer Ghani Al-Sakban, dealing with Sakban Al-Ali's refusal to implement compulsory conscription, dated March 23, 2023.

(17) Lotfi Jaafar Faraj, previous source, p. 288.

(18) (Same source, p. 290.

(19) (There were several factors behind the suicide of Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun, including the clash of his ministry's approach with the ambitions and goals of British circles, the most important of which was concluding a treaty with Britain. However, when forming his ministry, he confirmed that his policy was focused on eliminating any mandate formula in Iraqi-British relations, and that the negotiations taking place with Britain would be based on the complete independence of Iraq and accelerate its entry into the League of Nations, with Iraq assuming its responsibilities as an independent state. However, he failed to achieve this and was accused by the House of Representatives of treason, so he preferred suicide to get rid of those pressures.. For more, see: D.K.W., Royal Court Files, File No. 352/311, telegrams related to the death of Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun for the year 1929, and 12, p. 20.

(20) (Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, previous source, pp. 111-112; Abdul Razzaq Al-Hasani, History of Ministries, vol. 2, pp. 266-267; D.K.W., Royal Court Files, File No. 352/311, telegrams related to the death of Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun for the year 1929, 12, p. 20.

(21) (Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Nusayri, The National Defense Law in Iraq during the Mandate Era between National Demands and the British Position, Arab Horizons Magazine, Issue: 14, Baghdad, 1989, p. 91..

(22) (Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Nusayri, Nouri al-Sa'idu and his role in Iraqi politics until 1932, p. 303..

(23) (Alaa Jassim Muhammad, King Faisal I, his life and political cycle, Baghdad, 1990, p. 224..

(24) (Abdul Razzaq Ahmed Al-Nusairi, Nouri Al-Saeed, pp. 305-308.

(25) (Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, previous source, p. 114.

(26) (Records of the House of Representatives, fourth electoral session, regular meeting of 1933, session (10), January 4, 1934, p. 60..

(27) (he same source, Session (13), January 13, 1934, p. 111.

(( Najda Safwa, Iraq in British Documents in 1936, Basra, 1983, p. 202.

(xxx) (Najda Safwa, Iraq in British Documents in 1936, Basra, 1983, p. 202.

(xxxii) (The Iraqi Kingdom Guide, the Official Guide to Iraq for the year 1936: an illustrated annual administrative, social, economic, commercial, agricultural encyclopedia, edited by: Mahmoud Fahmi Darwais, Baghdad, 1936, p. 441.

(xxxiii) Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, previous source, pp. 120-121

(xxxiv) (Quoted from: Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, the previous source, p. 121.

<sup>xxxv</sup>) (A personal interview with Sheikh Amer Ghani Al-Sakaban, talking about Sheikh Sakaban Al-Ali's position on the compulsory conscription law, dated March 23, 2023.

(36) A personal interview with Sheikh Amer Ghani Al-Sakaban, talking about Sheikh Sakaban Al-Ali's position on the compulsory conscription law, dated March 23, 2023 ..

<sup>xxxvii</sup>) (A personal interview with Sheikh Amer Ghani Al-Sakaban, talking about Sheikh Sakaban Al-Ali's position on the compulsory conscription law, dated March 23, 2023.

<sup>xxxviii</sup>) (Quoted from: Raja Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, the previous source, pp. 125-126

<sup>xxxix</sup>