

SHIMON PERES WAS THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL AT THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FROM 1953 TO 1956.

The research is extracted from a doctoral dissertation)(

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Abstract:

This research aims to study the role of Shimon Peres in his pursuit of acquiring weapons through various means and methods. His sole concern was obtaining arms at any cost and from any source, making it essential for him to acquire them. He established close friendships with most arms suppliers and also forged intimate relationships with French officials, which enabled him to obtain massive quantities of weapons and financial aid.

Keywords: Shimon Peres, Ben-Gurion, France, arms acquisition.

Introduction

Shimon Peres played a significant role in the development of the Israeli military's armament system. Through his ingenuity and strategic approach, he managed to establish close relations with high-ranking officials in the French government. His strategy revolved around two main points: first, forging strong ties with senior officers and officials in the French Ministry of Defense, and second, gaining the favor of influential French socialist politicians, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Peres worked to reach agreements and treaties with them, enabling Israel to acquire various advanced weapons such as modern aircraft, tanks, artillery, and long-range missiles.

Moreover, he sought to form an alliance with France to counter the policies announced by Gamal Abdel Nasser, which posed a threat to Israel. For these reasons and more, we have chosen the subject of study entitled "Shimon Peres: Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense 1953-1956" to shed light on the nature of his work, which came after the government tasked him with accomplishing vital deals in service of the Israeli army.

The study is set to begin in the year 1953, as it marks the year when Shimon Peres assumed the position of Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The reason for choosing the year 1956 is because it is the year when Israel entered a war alongside France and Britain against Egypt. It was during this period that Shimon Peres adopted a policy that led Israel to form a risky alliance, causing international dissatisfaction, particularly from the United States and the Soviet Union. This diplomatic approach resulted in Israel facing criticism from its American allies, and there was a risk of aid and support being halted.

The decision to stop the analysis at this particular date is due to Peres' policy of forging the sensitive alliance, which complicated Israel's international relations and put pressure on the country to reevaluate its stance during that time..

The study focused on Shimon Peres' positions regarding arming Israel and the projects he presented to accomplish the aircraft manufacturing project. It also highlighted his efforts in

fundraising to establish a specialized company for this purpose. The study shed light on the circumstances and factors that hindered his work, especially the United States' refusal to supply Israel with weapons due to its commitment to the Tripartite Declaration issued in 1950 by France, Britain, and the United States.

As a result of this refusal, Peres turned towards France, which shared common interests with Israel, as both countries faced a common adversary in Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was supporting the Algerian revolution against the French..

The study relied on a significant and diverse collection of sources, including English books, Arabic books, scientific research papers, and a number of theses and university dissertations.

Shimon Peres¹ was the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense from 1953 to 1956

Shimon Peres returned from the United States after being appointed by David Ben-Gurion to complete his mission successfully. At just twenty-nine years old, Ben-Gurion appointed him as the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense in January 1953. Peres was tasked with supervising the aircraft manufacturing project and reorganizing all the military support services for the Israeli army.

His main challenge was to modernize Israel's armament and acquire various types of weapons. Peres knew that the process of arming Israel couldn't rely on the United States, as the American Congress had passed a law stating that the United States could not sell arms to any non-member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This law allowed the U.S. administration to retain the right to monitor the usage of such weapons. Israel was affected by this law, which limited its freedom in using the purchased arms from the U.S. government.⁽ⁱ⁾

Shimon Peres worked diligently to allocate a modest budget from the Israeli Ministry of Defense and gathered donations from the private sector to successfully accomplish the aircraft refurbishment project. He collected millions of dollars and established Bedek Aviation, a company focused on maintenance, in 1954. The first hangars were constructed that year, and the company continued its efforts, eventually completing the first aircraft in 1959. This aircraft was later used in the Six-Day War.⁽ⁱⁱ⁾

Israel witnessed new political developments, with David Ben-Gurion resigning in 1954, and Moshe Sharett assuming the position of Prime Minister⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾. Moshe Sharett's relationship with Shimon Peres became strained because Peres was considered one of David Ben-Gurion's loyalists and supporters. He was also seen as someone who interfered in Israel's foreign affairs and was considered untrustworthy. Meanwhile, Shimon Peres was working on coordinating with France to find multiple alternatives for Israel's sources of weapons,^(iv). Indeed, it is worth mentioning that France played a crucial role in supplying Israel with various types of weapons through various means, including gifts and financial donations. Israel continued to stockpile and train on these weapons.^(v)

The Franco-Israeli relations at that time were a unique event in the history of international relations for Israel. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel had benefited from a unique series of

1

military and scientific aid from France. The full cooperation and support were the main characteristics of the bilateral relationship between the two countries,^(vi) .The French government recognized Israel officially on January 24, 1949, and had voted in favor of the partition resolution for Palestine at the United Nations in November 1947. France was among the leading countries that guaranteed Israel's existence when it participated in the Tripartite Declaration^(vii) .The Tripartite Declaration was issued in 1950 by France, Britain, and the United States. France played a significant role in fortifying the Israeli entity by providing it with arms .^(viii) .

Shimon Peres mentioned that in the 1950s, Israel enjoyed great popularity in France among the political class, the media, intellectuals, and the general public. Additionally, many former resistance members were strong supporters of Israel, including Andre Malraux (1901-1976), who was one of Israel's most influential supporters. Peres recounted an encounter with Andre Malraux, where Malraux reportedly said that if he were younger, he would have fought alongside Israel in its war against the Arabs. The events unfolded as if they were somewhat responsible for Israel, and both Peres and Malraux shared a common worldview. Peres had numerous opportunities to meet with French politicians during the meetings of the International Socialist Conference.^(ix) .

Before its establishment, Israel used to buy weapons from France through the existing Zionist organizations there, individually, and then send them to the Zionist organizations in Palestine. After the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, military aid reached Israel, but it was somewhat limited and consisted mainly of light weapons and equipment. However, the situation evolved, and Israel eventually became entirely dependent on France for its armament process.^(x) .

France wanted to provide assistance to Israel to establish a foothold in the Middle East after its withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon. Many French officers had opposed the Nazis during the resistance against Germany and showed solidarity with the Jews. Additionally, the stance of Arab President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970), who supported the Algerian resistance against France, was also a significant factor that drove France to arm and support Israel politically .^(xi) .

Since 1952, Israel decided to make France its primary source for armament, taking advantage of France's issues with the Arab world. Israel conducted weapons deals with France, following a visit by Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, to Paris during the (Fnerce Mandes) government,^(xii) .Following this visit, France and Israel signed a military agreement, under which France agreed to sell military aircraft, including Ouragan and Mystère-2 fighter jets, to Israel. In return, Israel acquired 55mm Hotchkiss cannons from France.^(xiii) .

Shimon Peres, the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, intensified his efforts in 1953 to obtain weapons from France. He successfully acquired heavy artillery with a caliber of 155mm and AMX 13 tanks from France .^(xiv) .

Shimon Peres realized that France was one of the advanced European countries in producing rifles, tanks, and aircraft. Additionally, France needed markets to finance its arms industry and was less dependent on the United States compared to other European countries. To obtain a significant amount of French weapons, Peres decided to establish relationships with senior French officials and arrange meetings with them.^(xv) .

As the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres was in Paris since 1953, actively exploring all avenues to obtain French weapons. Initially, he managed to secure

informal contracts with French companies and manufacturers successfully. Later, he succeeded in obtaining a purchase contract for 24 Mystère-2 aircraft. However, Israel decided to replace the contract to purchase Mystère-4 aircraft, which were more advanced at that time. The French government had to seek a license from NATO to supply these aircraft to Israel. Negotiations with France continued until 1956 .^(xvi) .

When the French Ministry of Defense was enthusiastic about providing military aid to Israel, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not keen on such cooperation. The Foreign Affairs Ministry feared that such cooperation could harm French-Arab relations. Additionally, their lack of interest in this cooperation was also due to their displeasure with Israel's propaganda program calling for Jewish emigration from the Arab Maghreb, which contradicted France's efforts to maintain the Jewish community in Morocco as a stable and supportive element.^(xvii) .

In the beginning of 1954, Shimon Peres returned to France and met with leaders of various political parties, without exception. He explained to them that Israel was a small, independent state facing threats from its hostile neighbors and needed weapons to ensure its survival. He requested France's assistance in restoring the balance through armament in the Middle East,^(xviii) .Egypt relied on Czechoslovakia, and Iraq relied on Britain. Initially, some European leaders were hesitant to rush in arming Israel, but Shimon Peres managed to meet with Abel Toma, the Director-General of the French Ministry of the Interior, who, in turn, facilitated a meeting with the French Minister of the Interior, Maurice Papon, who was also responsible for Algerian affairs. Given the difficult situation in Algeria and its connection to the Arab world, efforts were combined to confront a common Arab enemy. As a result, the relations between the two parties deepened, and they collaborated in their intelligence agencies to combat their shared enemy, which was Egypt .^(xix) .

In late 1954, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres returned to France once again, and the latter stayed there for an extended period until he became known as the "arms engineer" of Israel in France. Military assistance to Israel began to arrive by the end of 1954, with the shipment of 12 Mystere planes and AMX-13 tanks at varying intervals .^(xx) .

Moshe Sharett sought to obtain a security guarantee from Washington, which means international protection from the United States. His government officially made the request on April 11, 1955. However, the response from the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles^(xxi), was that the United States accepted this idea in principle, but on the condition that Israel shows flexibility in the refugee issue and makes progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel found that the cost of the American security guarantee was too high, and events in the Middle East reached their peak during the Suez Crisis^(xxii). Many of the American assumptions regarding the region and Israel were subject to change due to these events, particularly the arms race. During this time, Egypt signed a weapons deal with Czechoslovakia at the end of September 1955. Israel did not receive a significant arms deal from the United States between 1952 and 1955, despite the signing of the U.S.-Israel Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on July 23, 1952 .^(xxiii) .

Moshe Sharett sought to obtain a security guarantee from Washington, meaning international protection from the United States. However, Egypt's arms deal that they acquired raised concerns for Israel as it shifted the regional power balance in favor of the Arabs at Israel's

expense. Israel attempted to acquire weapons from European countries but was unsuccessful in their efforts.

The American position was also frustrating for Israel, despite their exerted pressures on the United States. Israel received only a promise from U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Washington would reevaluate its stance regarding providing arms to Israel. Meanwhile, massive quantities of arms were reaching Egypt from the Eastern Bloc.

Despite Israel's requests for military purchases, the United States refused, and all their efforts seemed futile. They could only reach out to John Foster Dulles, who was described by Shimon Peres as a "strange mix of a pastor and a lawyer, sometimes using legal arguments and sometimes mysticism".

One of the reasons that made Dulles hesitant to arm Israel was the imposed arms embargo on the Middle East, and his personal defeat in a high Jewish population electoral district. These factors played a role in shaping the American approach towards arming Israel during that period.^(xxiv)

The Israeli attempts came to an end with a message from U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in which he confirmed that the United States would not oppose any Western country selling arms to Israel. As a result, Shimon Peres was the only one who called for directing efforts towards purchasing weapons from France.

The reason for Shimon Peres's turn towards France was a conversation that took place between him and the French Minister of Defense in a closed meeting on June 19, 1955, just before Egypt concluded the arms deal with Czechoslovakia. In that meeting, the French Minister of Defense stated that "every French citizen killed in Algeria is equivalent to every Egyptian killed in the Gaza Strip," signaling a step towards strengthening relations between France and Israel.^(xxv)

Afterward, David Ben-Gurion convened a crisis meeting attended by Moshe Sharett, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres. During the meeting, Ben-Gurion expressed his frustration with Dulles' comments, which he considered pure hypocrisy. He emphasized the need to obtain weapons from other countries and not rely on the United States.

As a result, David Ben-Gurion granted Shimon Peres full authorization to continue and negotiate with the French side regarding arming Israel. This decision marked a shift in Israel's approach, focusing on acquiring military support from France rather than relying on the United States.^(xxvi)

So, Shimon Peres worked on strengthening his relationship with the French Minister of the Interior, Bourges Maunoury, to coordinate French military cooperation with Israel. Maunoury^(xxvii) was willing to cooperate with Israel to the fullest extent because he was aware of the impact of the aid provided by Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Algerian revolution. This process was essential for Israel to obtain military support from France, especially given the regional developments and threats it was facing. Israel was able to establish a close relationship with France in the field of military and intelligence cooperation, and France provided significant support in enhancing Israel's military capabilities.^(xxviii)

Shimon Peres met with the French Minister of Defense, Guy Mollet^(xxix), at the end of 1955 and developed a strong personal friendship with him. This friendship had a significant impact on the development of French-Israeli relations.^(xxx)

These concerns led David Ben-Gurion to assign Shimon Peres to lead a delegation of Mapai party members, including Golda Meir^(xxxi) and Moshe Dayan, to France with the purpose of procuring weapons. The delegation arrived in Paris on April 12, 1956, and met with the French Minister of Defense, Guy Mollet, who intended to participate in the French elections.

Mollet secured a promise from Shimon Peres that Israel would support him if his party won the elections, on the condition that Israel would be armed. After several weeks, Guy Mollet became the Prime Minister, and as promised, the doors to French weapons opened wide for Israel. This marked the beginning of significant French military support to Israel.^(xxxii)

The delegation that went to Paris was not aware of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett's actions, as his behavior did not align with the government's directions. The Israeli government was preparing for a preemptive strike against Egypt in coordination with major powers like Britain and France, especially after Egypt acquired a weapons deal from Czechoslovakia and signed a mutual defense agreement with Syria on September 27, 1955, before the arms deal.^(xxxiii)

Moshe Sharett admitted that there were discussions about a major war on Egypt with the aim of occupying and annexing Gaza and parts of Sinai. This had been an important topic among the Israeli military leadership since the fall of 1953, but Sharett was opposed to the idea. When Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, returned to Tel Aviv and discussed the matter with the Israeli government, Sharett completely rejected the idea. This led to the conclusion that it was not possible to continue working between Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion.^(xxxiv)

As a result, Moshe Sharett resigned on June 19, 1956, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he was replaced by Golda Meir, who was the Minister of Labor at that time. Unlike Sharett, Golda Meir acknowledged David Ben-Gurion's authority to have the final say regarding national security matters.^(xxxv)

At that time, David Ben-Gurion agreed with Shimon Peres' logic, which stated that obtaining weapons from France would fail if the Israeli Foreign Ministry insisted on interfering in the negotiations regarding these deals. Also, the French side preferred to avoid diplomatic complications. This allowed Shimon Peres more freedom to act as he was no longer sharing decision-making with the Foreign Ministry or the Finance Ministry in matters related to arms purchases. Instead, the decision was made by Peres with the approval of David Ben-Gurion.^(xxxvi)

Shimon Peres understood the nature of the Fourth French Republic, which was inherently unstable. He saw an advantage in this system and could benefit from the instability and turmoil. Peres navigated between institutions, organizations, and decision-makers while maintaining friendships with a network of politicians, senior civil servants, and officers. He observed that within the Fourth Republic's framework, there were two power centers: the first centered around the Foreign Ministry, and the second represented by the military officers and the Defense Ministry. Therefore, Peres decided to maintain close relationships with both sides and exploit this situation in the best interest of Israel. He pursued arms deals with all parties involved.^(xxxvii)

In late June 1956, Shimon Peres sent a message to David Ben-Gurion stating, "France has agreed to immediately supply Israel with 20 AMX tanks and 60 Sherman tanks from their stock, as well as a quantity of 75mm guns and 24 Mystère IV aircraft." In response, Ben-Gurion replied to Peres, "Our loyal friends in Paris should understand that Abdel Nasser, who threatens us in the Negev and deep inside Israel, is the same enemy they are facing in Algeria."^(xxxviii) "

Shimon Peres claimed that when he was in Paris as the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, he first heard about the "Musketeer" operation, which both Britain and France were planning to reestablish international control over the Suez Canal after its nationalization by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Upon Peres's return to Tel Aviv in early June of the same year, he informed David Ben-Gurion about it. Ben-Gurion expressed his willingness to participate in the operation despite its objectives not being directly relevant to Israel. However, the involvement of Britain and France in the war would provide cover for Israeli military operations and protect them from further losses.^(xxxix)

When Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies became increasingly extreme, with him providing growing support to Algerian rebels, Shimon Peres mentioned that he heard voices within the French government calling for a military action against Nasser since May 1956. He proposed to David Ben-Gurion that Israel should form an unwritten alliance with France against Nasser. Ben-Gurion gave his approval to the idea, and as a result, Peres traveled to France to meet with Prime Minister Guy Mollet. Peres suggested a comprehensive deal for a joint operation against Egypt, in exchange for which Israel would receive significant weapons. Guy Mollet agreed to the proposal, and they decided to hold a secret conference in France within a few days.^(xl)

As a result, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan and Director-General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres traveled to Paris on June 22, 1956. They landed at an airport outside Paris and were transported to the small town of Ferme, where they were accommodated in a castle surrounded by a large walled garden to ensure absolute secrecy. Later that day, they held discussions with the French delegation, led by Louis Joxe, Chief of the Minister of Defense's office, and a representative of French intelligence. They agreed on overthrowing Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime. Dayan, in principle, agreed to cooperate with France to achieve this goal.

After a short break, the two delegations discussed the other aspect of the deal, which was Israel's supply of weapons. Shimon Peres presented Israel's demands, including 200 AMX tanks, 72 Mystère aircraft, 40,000 75mm shells, and 10,000 anti-tank missiles. The total value of the deal was 80 million dollars. Israel awaited the French response with bated breath, expecting rejection. However, the French response was, "Are you ready to sign now"?

Shimon Peres understood that this was a rare opportunity that might not come again, and he did not hesitate to take on the serious responsibility of making decisions beyond his authority. This act won him the mind and heart of David Ben-Gurion.^(xli)

Shimon Peres confirmed that three months before the campaign, a joint high command was formed by the French and the British to carry out the operation. David Ben-Gurion was already contemplating a preemptive operation to open the Straits of Tiran and neutralize the Egyptian Air Force by July 26, 1956, before it could utilize its weapons.^(xlii)

Bourges Maunoury asked Shimon Peres to hold a meeting on July 27, 1956, just one day after Nasser's nationalization speech. Peres, along with the Israeli ambassador to France, Nahum Nir, met with Maunoury, who was surrounded by several officers. Maunoury asked Peres how long it would take for the Israeli army to cut through Sinai and reach the Suez Canal. Peres answered that it would take approximately two weeks, leaving the army officers astonished.

Maunoury followed up with another question: Would Israel be able to participate in a tripartite military operation against Egypt? Peres's response was unequivocal, stating that under certain circumstances, they would be ready to do so. As a result, Maunoury briefed Peres on the planned operation against Egypt.

When Peres and Nahum Nir left the meeting, Nahum turned to him and said, "This time, you deserve to be hanged. How can you give such answers in such matters?" Peres replied to Nahum, "If we reject France's offer, we lose our only ally while being at war with the Arabs from all Israel's borders. If my answer pleases the Israeli government, then so be it. If not, they can consider it a personal, non-official decision."^(xliii)

During Shimon Peres's frequent visits to Paris to obtain weapons, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury informed him in early September 1956 that France was considering military measures against Gamal Abdel Nasser in the near future. He mentioned that Britain could also be involved, and the operation could be organized within two months. During this period, diplomatic efforts would continue, and there was an American perspective that favored long-term sabotage operations to overthrow Nasser. However, the French side preferred to take immediate action.

Bourges-Maunoury emphasized the need for urgency in the operation, as the French government might not remain in power for much longer. Therefore, it was preferable to proceed quickly against Gamal Abdel Nasser.^(xliv)

conclusion

Shimon Peres, as the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, recognized the need to diversify Israel's sources of weapons, especially in response to the growing threat posed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's hostility towards Israel and his pursuit of advanced military capabilities from the Eastern Bloc. Peres realized that the United States' cautious policy, driven by the fear of losing influence in the Arab world due to the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, hindered Israel's efforts to obtain support.

Thus, Peres turned to Europe, particularly France, to secure advanced weaponry, including aircraft, tanks, artillery, and various types of ammunition. He succeeded in building strong relationships with the French government, capitalizing on France's opposition to Nasser's support for the Algerian revolution, which provided Israel with the opportunity to receive significant arms shipments.

This policy of unspoken alliance with France evolved into a broader secret alliance in preparation for the subsequent military aggression against Egypt, known as the Suez Crisis of 1956, where Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated attack.

Shimon Peres demonstrated his astuteness in obtaining Western support, even when facing constraints from the United States. His ability to diversify Israel's sources of arms and forge alliances within the Western framework underscored his skill and effectiveness in a non-military role. This capability eventually led him to assume other prominent positions in the Israeli government and solidified his reputation as a masterful diplomat, capable of persuading external parties, especially Western powers, to support Israel.

Foot notes

ⁱ⁾ (Peter Peter Gali Shimon Peres, translated by Laila Hafez, "Seventy Years of Conflict in the Middle East: Testimonies for History, Dialogues with Andre Versaille," 2nd edition, Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 2007, p. 58..

⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ Shimon Peres, *No Room for Small Dreams*, HarperCollins, 2017, p53.

⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ Moshe Sharett: He is Moshe Shertok, the second Prime Minister of Israel, born in Ukraine in 1894. He migrated to Palestine in 1906 and was among the top graduates of Herzliya Gymnasium. He studied law in Istanbul and during World War I, he advocated the Ottomanization of all Jewish settlements in Palestine. He contributed to the English page of the newspaper "Davar," then became the Secretary of the Political Department in the Jewish Agency and served as an assistant to Chaim Weizmann. He played a role in establishing the Haganah organization and was considered the second man after Ben-Gurion. He was a member of the Knesset from the first to the fifth session and held some ministerial positions. He later became Prime Minister in 1953 and died in 1965 in Tel Aviv: Johnny Mansour, "Dictionary of Zionist and Israeli Media and Terminologies," Palestinian Studies Center, Jerusalem, 2009, p. 277.

^{iv)} (David Landau, "The Battle for Peace: Shimon Peres' Diaries," translated by Ammar Fadel and Malik Fadel, Al-Ahliya Printing and Publishing, Amman, 1995, p. 101.

^{v)} (ahmoud Sheet Khattab, "Military of Israel," 2nd edition, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1970, p. 379..

^{vi)} (Zahi Al-Aqra, "Israeli-French Relations 1956-1967," *Palestinian Affairs Journal*, Issue 78, 1978, p. 101.

^(vii) The Tripartite Declaration: The declaration was issued on May 25, 1950, when the United States, Britain, and France issued it after discussions held in London before the meeting of the NATO Council. It addressed the tense situation in the Middle East due to the unrest in Egypt and Iran against British policies: Fa'iq Hakim and Imad Makluf Asal, "The Evolution of the French Position on the Palestinian Issue Since the Tripartite Declaration in the Suez Crisis 1950-1956," *Research Journal of Basra*, Issue 28, Volume 1, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basra, 2001, p. 190-191

^(viii) Mohammed Ismail Mohammed Al-Jayyash, "The Internal Situation in Israel and Its Impact on the 1967 War," unpublished master's thesis, Islamic University, Gaza, 2088, p. 29..

^{ix)} (Peter Peter Gali Shimon Peres, the previous source, p. 59..

^{x)} (Ahmed Saleh Aboush, "France's Stance on the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1973," unpublished master's thesis, College of Education, University of Mosul, 2006, p. 34.

- ^{xi}) (Bilal Shakir Al-Rashaydeh, "Israeli Relations and Their Impact on Arab National Security until the End of the Fourth French Republic in 1958," *Journal of Al-Hussein Bin Talal University for Research*, Al-Hussein Bin Talal University, Issue 7, 2021, pp. 221-234..
- ^{xii}) (Mendes France: A French Jewish politician born in 1907 in Paris, who became the representative of the Ministry of Finance in 1938. He was part of the Free French forces during World War II and became the Minister of Finance in the interim government in 1943. He was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1953 to 1955 and later appointed as a Minister of State: Atiyatullah Ahmad, "Political Dictionary," Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 3rd edition, Cairo, 1968, p. 1229..
- ^{xiii}) (Ahmed Saleh Aboush, "France's Stance on the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1973," unpublished master's thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Mosul, 2006, pp. 34-35 .
- ^{xiv}) (sim Muhammad Imran, "French-Israeli Relations in the Context of the Palestinian Issue from 1967-1986," unpublished master's thesis, College of Education, University of Baghdad, 1989, p. 5.
- ^{xv}) Michael Bar-Zohar, *Shimon Peres: The Biography*, Publisher: Random House, 2007, p93.
- ^{xvi}) (Hamed Abdullah Rabie and others, "Israel's International Relations," *Palestinian Studies Center*, College of Political Sciences, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, n.d., p. 82..
- ^{xvii}) (Faik Hakeem and Imad Muklef Asal, "The Evolution of the French Position on the Palestinian Issue since the Issuance of the Tripartite Declaration in the Suez Crisis 1950-1956," *Basra Research Journal*, Issue 28, Volume 1, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basra, 2001, p. 238..
- ^{xviii}) (Butrus Butrus Ghali and Shimon Peres, the same source, p. 60..
- ^{xix}) (The same source, p. 60.
- ^{xx}) (Ahmed Saleh Haboush, the same source, p. 36.
- ^{xxi}) (John Foster Dulles: Born in 1882, he practiced diplomacy and international activities for thirty-three years, participated in the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, published his book "War or Peace," and was appointed Secretary of State during President Eisenhower's term from 1953 to 1959. He was known for his hostility to communism and policy of non-alignment. Abeer Khalil Ibrahim Al-Masoudi, "US Policy and the Soviet Union in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict, 1970-1981," unpublished master's thesis, College of Education - Safi Al-Din, University of Babylon, 2011, p. 10..
- ^{xxiii}) (Abdul Hakim Amer Mahmoud Lafi, "The American Role in the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948-1982," unpublished master's thesis, College of Arts, Department of History and Archaeology, Islamic University of Gaza, Palestine, 2011, pp. 81-82 .
- ^(xxiv)MATTI GOLAN, THE ROAD TO PEACE ABIOGRAPHY OF SHION PERES, op,cit , p36.
- ^(xxv)Ibid, p30-31.
- ^(xxvi) MICHEL BAR –ZOHAR , op,cit , p106.
- ^{xxvii}) (French politician born in 1914, he served as an artillery officer from 1935 to 1940. He became Minister of the Interior in 1955, then Minister of Defense during Mollet's term and Prime Minister in 1957. See: Imad Muklef Asal Al Badarn, "The Previous Source," p. 195 ..
- ^{xxviii}) (Muhammad Hasanin Heikal, "The Story of the Suez Canal, The Last Battles in the Age of Giants," The Printing and Distribution Company, Beirut, 1977, p. 27 ..
- ^{xxix}) (Guy Mollet, a French politician born in 1905, was one of the prominent members of the French Socialist Party. He was arrested in 1940 and released in 1942 by the pro-Vichy government. He fought within the ranks of the resistance and was elected as a parliament member in 1946. He

became Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party from 1949 to 1960 and served as Minister of Defense from February 1, 1956, until June 13, 1957. He resigned in 1957 due to the failure of the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt. He passed away in 1975. See: Imad Muklef Asal Al Badarn, "The Previous Source," p. 162.

^{xxx}) (Hamed Abdullah Rabie and others, "The Previous Source," p. 83.

^(xxxix) Golda Meir was born in Russia in 1898 and later emigrated to the United States in 1915 with her husband. In 1921, she moved to Palestine and worked on a kibbutz. She held several important positions, including Secretary of the Women's Council of Histadrut in 1928. After the establishment of Israel, she was elected as a member of the Knesset and served as Minister of Labor from 1949 to 1956 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1966. She became the Prime Minister of Israel from 1969 to 1974. She passed away in 1978 due to leukemia. See: Osama Juma Al-Ashqar and Hassan Adel Al-Rifai, "Israeli Presidents: Presidents of the Knesset - Prime Ministers from Establishment to 2006," Safahat for Studies and Publishing, Damascus, 2007, pp. 111, 113; Golda Meir, "Confessions of Golda Meir," translated by Aziz Azmi, Dar Al-Taa'awun for Printing and Publishing, Cairo, 1979; Ali Razaq Zahir, "Golda Meir and Her Role towards France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union 1969-1974," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basra, 2019..

^{xxxii}) (Jassim Muhammad Shaghayt Al-Kaabi, "The Previous Source," p. 139..

^{xxxiii}) (Nasreen Saleh Abu Hameed, "Internal Political Developments in Israel (1948-1967)," unpublished master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Basra, 2019, p. 72..

^{xxxiv}) (Livya Roccach, "Reading Moushi Sharit's Diary: Israel's Plan to Establish the Maronite Entity," Dar Ibn Khaldoun, Beirut, 1981, p. 15 .

^{xxxv}) (Hazem Ahmad Khalil Qasem, "The Political Situation in Israel (1948-1956)," unpublished master's thesis, College of Arts, Islamic University of Gaza, Palestine, 2015, p. 162.

^(xxxvi) Guy Ziv, op,cit , p421.

^(xxxvii) MICHEL BAR –ZOHAR , op,cit , p94.

^{xxxviii}) (Citing from: Muhammad Hasanin Heikal, "The Suez Files: Thirty Years War," Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, Cairo, 1986, pp. 375-356 ..

^{xxxix}) (Shamil Abdul Qadir, "The Secret History of Israeli Leaders (From Ben-Gurion to Netanyahu)," Dar Aldhafaf for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Baghdad, n.d., p. 38..

^(xl) MATTI GOLAN, THE ROAD TO PEACE ABIOGRAPHY OF SHION PERES, op,cit, p38.

^(xli) MATTI GOLAN, THE ROAD TO PEACE ABIOGRAPHY OF SHION PERES, op,cit, p39.

^{xlii}) (Hamed Abdullah Rabie and others, The Previous Source, p. 83".

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